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I. Introduction
A. The Problem of Radioactive Pollution of the
Environment
Since the 1970's, world public opinion has become more
informed about the environmental consequences of the peace-
ful uses of nuclear energy. However, at the dawn of the nu-
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clear age in the 1950's there was great enthusiasm about the
use of nuclear energy throughout the world.1 Nuclear energy
was perceived to be capable of curing social diseases, such as
poverty and hunger, and biological diseases, such as cancer.
There was a belief that if used for peaceful purposes, nuclear
energy would be an inexpensive and absolutely safe source of
power.2 Only military uses of nuclear energy were clearly un-
derstood to present a serious danger for people and the
Earth's environment.3 For this reason, international law-
making in this area primarily focused on the cessation of the
nuclear arms race, the disarmament of nuclear weapons and
the establishment of a regime for the non-proliferation of nu-
clear weapons.4 Although the international regime that de-
veloped in this respect is not perfect,5 it represents an
important achievement of international law and politics, and
provides, inter alia, for international verification of States'
compliance with non-proliferation obligations including on-
site inspections of nuclear facilities and processes. As a for-
mer deputy director general of the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency for Safeguards described it, the non-proliferation
regime "was a political quantum leap changing the percep-
tion of unlimited national sovereignty - a consequence of the
1. N.L. Char & B.J. Csik, Nuclear Power Development: History and Out-
look, IAEA BULL., Vol. 29 No. 3 1987, 19.
2. PAUL C. SZASz, THE LAW AND PRACTICES OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC
ENERGY AGENCY (1970).
3. MANSON BENEDICT ET AL., NUCLEAR CHEMIcAL ENGINEERING (1981).
4. On the regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons see JOZEF
GOLDBLAT, TWENTY YEARS OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: IMPLEMENTA-
TION AND PROSPECTS (1990); NUCLEAR NON-PROLiFERATION AND GLOBAL SECUR-
rry (David B. Dewitt ed., 1987); RICHARD K BErs ET AL., NONPROLIFERATION
AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (Joseph A. Yager ed., 1980).
5. See, e.g., KATHLEEN C. BArnEY, STRENGTHENING NUCLEAR NONPROLIFER-
ATION (1993). Some writers argue even to the general illegality of nuclear weap-
ons. See Burns H. Weston, Nuclear Weapons and International Law:
Prolegomenon to General Illegality, 4 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INL & COMP. L. 227
(1983); Burns H. Weston, Nuclear Weapons Versus International Law: A Con-
textual Reassessment, 28 MCGH.L L.J. 542 (1982-83); FRANCIS A. BOYLE ET AL.,
IN RE: MORE THAN 50,000 NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ANALYSES OF THE ILLEGALITY OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (1991).
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technical quantum leap in destructive power prompted by the
discovery of nuclear energy."6
The last twenty years have shown that even peaceful,
non-military uses of nuclear energy can pose a serious danger
to the Earth's population and the environment. The nuclear
accidents at Three Mile Island in the United States and at
Chernobyl in the Ukraine were grave manifestations of this
danger.7 Chernobyl demonstrated that an accident at a nu-
clear facility, regardless of the location, can have severe
transboundary consequences due to environmental transpor-
tation of radioactive effluents.8 Today another "quantum
leap" in international law is pending, this time in the area of
environmental protection from radioactive pollution. This ar-
ticle discusses the present state of the international law pro-
tecting the environment from radioactive pollution, the issues
awaiting solution, the new developments underway and
speculates the best ways to implement these developments.
This author takes an environmentalist approach in this
discussion, that is not to say that the problem of protecting
people from the hazards of nuclear energy is neglected. Indi-
viduals, as well as the environment, are victims of radioactive
emissions from nuclear incidents. However, by comple-
menting a regime for environmental protection with the pro-
tection of human beings, superior protection for human
beings would result since the focus would be aimed at ensur-
ing healthy living conditions in all parts of the world. Plan-
ning for future environmental consequences constitutes a
6. H. Grimm, !AEA Safeguards: Milestones In Development & Implemen-
tation, IAEA BuLL., Vol. 29 No. 3 1987, 29. He further stated, "in the begin-
ning, the motivation of States to accept safeguards was perhaps dominated by
the desire to participate in a new technology with unforeseeable prospects.
Later on, the main motive became the understanding that it is in the very se-
curity interest of non-nuclear weapon States to refrain from acquiring nuclear
weapons." Id. On the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards see for
example DAvID FISHER & PAUL SzAsz, SAFEGUARDING THE ATOM: A CRIcAL
APPRAisAL (Jozef Goldblat ed. 1985); BAILEY, supra note 5, at 67-78.
7. See GRIGORI MEDVEDEV, THE TRUTH AaoUT CHERNOBYL (1989).
8. See Barry Smith & Arthur Chanlesby, The Radioactive Release from
Chernobyl & its Effects, in THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT AND rrs IMPLICATIONS FOR
THE UNITED KINGDOM 25 (1988).
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more disciplined approach to protecting the place we live,
namely the Earth, and will yield returns in the long run.
When an accident occurs, people suffering the effects of
radiation receive treatment or are evacuated. However, the
environment bears the radioactivity left by human action. In
the long run, the deadly debt of radioactivity in the environ-
ment will be paid by the people. No words can express the
grief and suffering that Chernobyl brought to the people in
the adjacent areas of Ukraine, Russia, and Byelorus.9 The
land suffered together with the people; the eighteen mile area
around the nuclear power plant will remain contaminated for
decades to come. Moreover, all Byelorus was declared an eco-
logical disaster zone after Chernobyl. 10
Although, there are instances when people do not suffer
direct or immediate injury from released radiation, once re-
leased into the environment, radiation will accumulate. For
instance, discharges from a nuclear reprocessing plant at Sel-
lafield, England, caused major radioactive contamination in
the Irish Sea. Once in the sea, radionuclides are deposited on
the sea floor, so that the sea becomes a major sink for the
radionuclides n. 1 Due to these long-term effects of radiation
contamination, nuclear waste disposal at sea is a highly con-
troversial issue. The previously unknown practice of the So-
viet military dumping its high-level and low-level nuclear
waste in the Pacific Ocean has now come to the attention of
international environmentalist organizations. -1 2
There are instances where urgent environmental re-
sponse measures have limited human exposure to radioactive
9. For a minute-by-minute account on the Chernobyl tragedy, MEDVEDEV,
supra note 7. See also CHERNOBYL: A POLICY RESPONSE STUDy (Boris Seger-
stabl ed. 1991); DR. ROBERT PETER GALE & THOMAS HAiSER, FINAL WARNING:
THE LEGACY OF CHERNOBYL (1988).
10. "Each reader of THE TRUTH ABOUT CHERNOBYL must understand that
Chernobyl was a universal tragedy, that the harm done by it is still going on
today, that millions of people are still living on land contaminated with radia-
tion, and that they need help and compassion." MEDVEDEV, supra note 7, at xi.
11. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNITIEs, THE STATE OF THE ENVI-
RONMENT IN THE EUROPEAN Com murY 279 (1987) [hereinafter THE STATE OF
THE ENvmoNmT IN =rT E.C.I.
12. William J. Broad, Soviet Dumping of a Waste-Stunning Report, S.F.
CHRONICLE, Apr. 27, 1993, at Al.
1994] 189
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environmental pollution. For example, in 1966, United
States bombers carrying atomic bombs crashed at the village
of Palomares in Southern Spain causing two of the bombs to
catch fire, and dispersing radioactive substances over an area
of several hundred hectares. 13 A ten centimeter layer of
earth was removed, transported and treated as radioactive
waste in some places while other contaminated surfaces were
turned over to a depth of thirty centimeters. 14 The soil in the
area is still contaminated to some extent; however, the popu-
lation's exposure to radiation resulting from this contamina-
tion is extremely low. 15
Nuclear science has developed two disciplines which are
used in developing environmental protection from nuclear
hazards: radiation protection and nuclear safety.' 6 Although
these are technical disciplines, standards that are adopted by
individual States in the area of radiation protection and nu-
clear safety comprise a part of their national nuclear law. If
those standards are adopted internationally, they will serve
as a basis for the international regulation of nuclear energy
for the purpose of protecting the environment.
Radiation protection is concerned with the protection of
the individuals, their progeny and mankind as a whole, while
allowing necessary activities that may result in exposure to
radiation. 17 Radiation protection is ensured by establishing:
"(a) maximum permissible doses compatible with adequate
safety; (b) maximum permissible levels of exposure and con-
tamination; and (c)... measures for the health surveillance
of workers."' 8
13. EuR. PA L., Written Questions with Answers, No. 171/86, 1988 O.J. (C
123) 1.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Char & Csik, supra note 1, at 19.
17. See 1990 RECOMMENDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIO-
LOGICAL PROTECTION, USER'S EDITION (H. Smith ed. 1992) [hereinafter 1990
RECOMMENDATIONS OF ICRPI].
18. TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EuROPEAN CoMMUNITIEs, TREATIES AMEND-
ING THESE TREATIES, SINGLE EURoPEAN ACT 644 (Office for Official Publications
of the European Communities ed. 1987) [hereinafter TREATIES ESTABLISHING
THE EUROPEAN CoMMuNITIES]. The International Atomic Energy Agency
prescribes in the Basic Safety Standards for radiation protection maximum per-
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The primary aim of nuclear safety is to keep the popula-
tion's and worker's exposure to radiation from nuclear facili-
ties as small as reasonably possible both during normal
operation and in the event of an accident.' 9 Nuclear safety
provides measures for: (a) safety of nuclear power plants (i.e.
safe design, construction, operation and siting of nuclear fa-
cilities); (b) safety of other nuclear facilities in the nuclear
fuel cycle; and (c) safety of transport of nuclear materials.20
Because nuclear safety concerns itself with design and
operation of nuclear facilities, the author refers to it as a
technology-based method of regulating the use of nuclear en-
ergy. In contrast to nuclear safety, radiation protection can
be labeled a biology-based method of regulation. It sets forth
the maximum permissible doses and levels of radiation, i.e.
doses received per unit of time that can be received by human
beings without harm to their health.21 If radiation protection
would set forth limits for the levels of radioactivity in the am-
bient air, water and soil, it could be labelled a media-based
method of control. This is the primary contradiction in the
discipline of radiation protection. On one hand, radiation
protection serves as a basis for environmentally oriented pro-
tective measures. On the other hand, however, as a branch of
science, radiation protection does not include the environ-
ment per se within the sphere of its concerns. According to
the International Commission on Radiation Protection
(ICRP),22 the basic criteria that underlies the radiation pro-
tection regulations is defined as follows:
[E]nvironmental control needed to protect man to the de-
gree currently thought desirable will ensure that other
species are not put at risk. Occasionally, individual mem-
missible doses and dose limits. THE AGENCY'S SAPErY STANDARDS AND MEAS-
uREs 1, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/18 (Apr. 1976).
19. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY & WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZA-
TION, NUCLEAR POWER, Tm ENvmoNmENT AND MAN 81 (1982) [hereinafter Nu-
CLEAR POWER].
20. Id. at 81-102.
21. See infra notes 132, 247-55 and accompanying text.
22. The ICRP was established in 1928. The ICRP is a non-governmental
organization and issues recommendations on the use of ionizing radiation and
processes that generate radiation and radioactive materials. Id. at 1.
19941
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bers of non-human species might be harmed, but not to the
extent of endangering whole species or creating imbalance
between species. At the present time, the Commission con-
cerns itself with mankind's environment only with regard
to the transfer of radionuclides through the environment
since this directly affects radiological protection of man.23
Thus, the ICRP is only concerned with the protection of
man and not of other species.24 The ICRP plays a central role
in formulating the radiation protection standards applied
throughout the world. The ICRP's recommendations directly
influence the radiation protection laws and the regulations of
most States, as well as international standards on radiation
protection.25
This author believes that it is necessary to complement
the definition of radiation protection by including criteria for
the protection of the environment. There are no independent
criteria for the protection of the environment in the current
definition of radiation protection.26 According to the ICRP's
definition of radiation protection, any element of the environ-
ment is considered to be sufficiently protected if human be-
ings are sufficiently protected.2 7 If this definition were
complemented by a criterion for the protection of the environ-
ment it would reflect reality and, more importantly, provide
an impetus for the international community to regulate the
environment globally..
Although nuclear safety and radiation protection form
the basis for the regulation of nuclear energy in regard to en-
vironmental protection, not every aspect of these methods re-
late to the protection of the environment. For instance,
certain events, such as radon in buildings, although con-
nected with radiation protection, would not have environ-
23. Id. at 3-4.
24. Id. at 1.
25. An examination of radiation protection laws and regulations in individ-
ual States shows that the ICRP's radiation protection principles have been in-
corporated in almost every case, albeit with different wordings and varying
degrees of emphasis.
26. Id. at 3-4.
27. Id.
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mental consequences. In analyzing the development of
international regulation for environmental protection, this
author concentrates on those aspects of nuclear safety and ra-
diation protection that have environmental impacts.
B. Nuclear Energy: Why Is It Dangerous to the
Environment?
In this section, the author will show, first, that nuclear
facilities, especially nuclear reactors, are inherently danger-
ous to the environment and only through the use of special
safety systems and operational measures can radioactivity
produced by nuclear reactors be curbed.28 Therefore, the iso-
lation of radioactivity from the environment depends upon
nuclear safety. Second, this author will demonstrate that,
although there are only a few basic designs of nuclear reac-
tors, there can be many variations in these designs. For ex-
ample, use of different coolants, 29 moderators,30 or alloys of
the rod assemblies 31 can alter the paths of escape of radioac-
tive materials from the reactors in both normal operations
and accidents. Nuclear safety systems and operating tech-
niques also vary with the use of different types of reactors. 32
Nuclear energy is currently applied in diverse areas of
human activity, such as medicine, nuclear research, agricul-
ture, and food preservation. However, the primary danger to
the environment emanates from the generation of nuclear
power. This is because the nuclear power plant, the principal
section in the nuclear fuel cycle chain,33 is the place where
28. See infra notes 129-66 and accompanying text.
29. "A substance circulated through a nuclear reactor to remove or transfer
heat. Common coolants are water, air, carbon dioxide, liquid sodium, and so-
dium potassium alloy." GEOFFREY G. EIcHHoLz, ENviRoNmENTAL ASPECTS OF
NUCLEAR POWER 667 (1976).
30. "A moderator is a delay element used in nuclear reactors to slow down
nuclear fission. Moderators are normally constructed from graphite or deute-
rium." DAVID DooLEY & NEiL KIRKPATRICK, ErmoiRNmNrAL GLOSSARY 109
(1993).
31. See infra note 48.
32. See infra notes 58-96 and accompanying text.
33. Some of the major elements of the nuclear fuel cycle include; uranium
mining and ore processing, uranium refining, conversion and enrichment, fuel
fabrication, electricity production on a nuclear power plant, spent fuel manage-
1994] 193
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the fission process occurs. 34 During this process, hundreds of
artificial radionuclides are produced.3 5 Although many of
these radionuclides are short-lived, it is their substantial
quantities that cause concern:
[The] quantities of the radioactive fission products and
transuranic radionuclides produced in a single nuclear
power plant, in terms of their associated radioactivity, are
staggering. A standard 1,000 mega-watt nuclear generat-
ing plant contains more than 15 billion curies of radioactiv-
ity in its core after 300 days of operation. This is about
equal to the natural radioactivity contained in all the
oceans .36
In normal operation, a nuclear power plant produces a cer-
tain amount of radioactive emissions; but, because of the
enormous volume of short-lived and long-lived radionuclides
accumulated in the reactor, an outburst of radionuclides
which could result from a nuclear accident can be
disastrous. 37
In a conventional power station, heat is produced by a
chemical reaction.38 The coolant removes the heat and gener-
ates steam to drive turbines.3 9 This produces electricity.40 In
a nuclear plant, heat is produced by nuclear reaction.41
At the core of a nuclear power plant is the nuclear reac-
tor.42 The reactor is the primary source of the ra-
ment and transportation of nuclear materials. NucLEAR PoWER, supra note 19,
at 19-56.
34. Id.
35. John-Mark Stensvaag, Regulating Radioactive Air Emissions from Nu-
clear Generating Plants: A Primer for Attorneys, Decisionmakers and Interven-
ors, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 9 (1983).
36. Id. at 9-10 (footnotes omitted).
37. See id.
38. DRAGANIC ET AL., RADIATION AND RADIOACTIVITY ON EARTH AND BEYOND
249 (1990).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. See generally NucLEAR PowER, supra note 19, at 29; BENEDICT ET
AL., supra note 3; EIcHHoLz, supra note 29, at 143.
42. DRAGANmc NT AL., supra note 38, at 250.
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dionuclides. 43 The fuel used in nuclear reactors is usually
uranium" or plutonium.45 These radioactive elements are
placed into fuel rods, which are thin metal tubes.46 The fuel
rod shell is called the "cladding."47 Several fuel rods are at-
tached together to form 'fuel assemblies' in a configuration
that allows the coolant to flow between the rods. 48 .
The coolant is used to avoid the melting of the uranium
assembly.49 In some reactors, the coolant also serves as a
moderator to absorb the prompt neutrons released in a chain
fission reaction to keep the rate of the chain reaction con-
stant.50 The substances that are currently used as coolant
include: ordinary or heavy water (deuterium) and the gases
helium and carbon dioxide. 5' Graphite can also be used as a
moderator, particularly in gas-cooled reactors.52
The various radioactive substances that are by-products
of nuclear power generation end up as nuclear wastes.5 3
Generally, waste-production is a by-product of any type of
electricity production.54 In the case of nuclear power genera-
43. Id.
44. "A heavy silvery-white metallic element, radioactive... [tihe element
occurs in several minerals ... from which it is extracted and processed for use
in research, nuclear fuels, and nuclear weapons." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIoNARY 1329 (2d ed. 1982).
45. "A naturally radioactive, silvery, metallic transuranic element, occur-
ring in uranium ores and produced artificially by neutron bombardment of ura-
nium... [i]t is radiological poison .... " Id. at 955.
46. Stensvaag, supra note 35, at 5.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. EIcaHoLz, supra note 29 at 667.
50. BENEDICT ET AL., supra note 3.
51. DRAGANIC ET AL., supra note 38, at 250. In addition to this,
[slodium, a soft and silvery white metal which melts at 98 degrees
Celsius is used as a coolant in fast neutron reactors in which large
amounts of heat are released in a small volume.
At present, nuclear energy production is based mainly on the
thermal neutron fission process. The contribution of power reactor
using fast neutrons was less than 1 percent in the mid-1980's.
Id.
52. EicHHoLZ, supra note 29, at 145.
53. DRAGANIC ET AL., supra note 38, at 250.
54. Id.
19941
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tion, waste is radioactive and consists of fission products55
and actinides56 in the spent fuel, in addition to various solid,
liquid and gaseous materials which are formed during the op-
eration or reprocessing of the fuel elements.57
There are several main types of nuclear reactors in oper-
ation throughout the world. Reactors can differ according to
the fuel used, cladding material, moderator and coolant
used.58 The gas-cooled graphite moderated reactors were
first developed in the United Kingdom and France. 59 A fur-
ther development of this type, which has not yet reached full
commercial utilization, is the high-temperature gas-cooled re-
actor,60 that cools at a temperature of 900 degrees celsius.61
There are two basic types of reactors that use light water as
coolant: the pressurized water reactors (PWR)6 2 and boiling
water reactors (BWR)63 (sixty one percent are PWR and
twenty three percent are BWR).64
The PWR and BWR are the two basic types of reactors in
the former Soviet Union's nuclear power program.65 Some
reactors are BWR which use light water as the coolant
and graphite as the moderator.66 The fuel is natural ura-
55. "[A] nuclide produced either by fission or by subsequent radioactive de-
cay of the nuclides formed in the fission process." EICHHOLZ, supra note 29, at
668.
56. "A series of radioactive elements in the seventh row of the periodic table
having atomic number 89 to 103, commencing with Actinium, and including
elements such as plutonium and uranium." DOOLEY & KIRKPATRICKi, supra note
30, at 2.
57. DRAGANc ET ALi., supra note 38, at 250.
58. NUcLEAR POWER, supra note 19, at 31.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 30-31.
61. Id.
62. In a PWR heat is transferred from the core to a heat exchanger by over-
pressurized water. This allows it to reach high temperatures without boiling.
EicHHoLZ, supra note 29, at 671.
63. In a BWR, water is used as a coolant and a moderator. The water is
boiled in the core and produces steam that drives the turbine. Id. at 666.
64. DRAGANIc Er AL., supra note 38, at 250. Heavy-water reactors have
been operating in several countries, including Canada, Germany, India, Argen-
tina and Pakistan. See NucLEAR POWER, supra note 19, at 33.
65. NUCLEAn POWER, supra note 19, at 33.
66. See id.
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niun.67 Other countries also use a design similar to the
Chernobyl-type. 68 After the Chernobyl accident, the oldest of
four reactors supplying plutonium for weapons in the United
States was temporarily shut down.69 Like the Chernobyl re-
actor, it had a graphite-moderated and water-cooled core and
no concrete containment dome.70
The PWR and BWR are in common use in the United
States.71 Both types of reactors use light water as the cool-
ant. The main difference between them is that the PWR is a
two-circuit reactor, whereas the BWR is a one-circuit reac-
tor.72 In the PWR, water, which is under a pressure of about
one hundred fifty atmospheres, circulates from the reactor
core to a steam generator, and from there back to the core in
a closed system called a "primary" circuit.7 3 When heat is
transferred to this generator it produces steam in a "secon-
dary" circuit, the steam drives the turbine producing
electricity.7 4
In the BWR, the water flows through the reactor at low
pressure, this causes the water to boil and partially convert
to steam as it flows through the reactor. 75 The coolant leav-
ing the reactor is separated into water and steam.7 6 The
water is recycled and the steam goes directly to the turbine. 77
There is no external steam generator, the reactor provides
this function. 78
67. See MEDVEDEv, supra note 7, at 61. See also NUCLEAR POWER, supra
note 19, at 33.
68. See e.g., Joel Havemann, Chernobyl: Five Years Later, LA. TnMEs, Apr.
23, 1991, at H7; Chernobyl Type Reactor to be Closed for 6 Months, LA. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 1986, at 1.1 [hereinafter Chernobyl Reactor Closed]; Kenneth Jautz,
Soviets to Inform Us About Reactors Being Built in Cuba, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept.
26, 1986, at 3.
69. Chernobyl Reactor Closed, supra note 68.
70. DRAGANIC r AL., supra note 38, at 260.
71. BENEDICT Er AL., supra note 3, at 8.
72. DRAGANIc ET AL., supra note 38, at 251-52.
73. Id. at 251.
74. Id. See also BENEDICT Err AL., supra note 3, at 7.
75. BENEDICT ET AL., supra note 3, at 8.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. In a BWR the fuel and moderator remain in place and the coolant
flows through the reactor to a steam generator, the coolant is cooled by heat
1994]
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During the nuclear reaction, the reactor fuel accumulates
sizable inventory of fission products representing an enor-
mous source of radioactivity. Since the cladding is only a
fairly thin metal sheath around the fuel, which is subject
to thermal stresses, mechanical forces, internal gas pres-
sures and corrosive action by the coolant, almost inevitably
small cracks will develop in it during operation that will
permit a small but finite fraction of the fission products to
leak into the coolant.79
Theoretically, in the PWR, the radioactive coolant circulates
only in the primary circuit, but, in practice, contamination
can occur in the second circuit due to leaks in the conduits.80
In the BWR, there is only one circuit in which the radioactive
coolant flows.81 Thus, the turbine should be sealed in a leak-
proof casing, this casing also collects the steam losses and cir-
culates them back to the reactor.8 2
Coolant is the main pathway through which radioactive
fission products escape the reactor.8 3
Some of the radioactive fission products and transuranic
elements that escape to the coolant are in solid form and
tend to stay with the liquid water, from which they eventu-
ally are removed by demineralizers. Other escaping ra-
dionuclides are more volatile, however, tending to diffuse
into the atmosphere.8 4
exchange with feedwater. The feedwater is converted to steam, which drives a
steam turbine. Id. at 7. The problem with this type of reactor can be that
though the water effectively takes up heat from the fuel elements, the graphite
moderator also collects heat and has to be cooled separately. In order to pre-
vent overheating of the graphite and the risk of fire, a separate cooling system
circulates a gaseous mixture of helium and nitrogen. See DRAGAic Er AL.,
supra note 38, at 253.
79. EicHHoLz, supra note 29, at 172.
80. DRAGAiC T AL., supra note 38, at 251.
81. Id. at 252-53.
82. Id. Though this author has long believed that the two-circuit reactor
should be "safer" than the one-circuit reactor, being a lay person, the author
vainly seeked for proof of her view point until she came across the following
conclusion of Grigori Medvedev: A two-circuit plant is cleaner because it has
less extensive pipeline communications, and the discharges are less radioactive,
therefore, it is safer. See MEDVEDEV, supra note 7, at 62.
83. Stensvaag, supra note 35, at 12-13.
84. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Their escape or removal takes place in various ways, depend-
ing on the type of reactor.8 5 These radionuclides constitute
one type of radioactivity that occurs in the coolant.8 6 Activa-
tion of the crud87 in the coolant is also a source of activation
products.8 8 Crud generation at BWR's and PWR's differs sig-
nificantly primarily because of the different alloys used in the
coolant loops.8 9
Due to the differences of design, escape paths for the ac-
tivities differ between reactor types. In the BWR:
[Siteam is raised immediately above the reactor core,
within the reactor containment. This steam is then passed
to the turbine without an intervening heat exchanger and
subsequently condensed and cleaned. An escape of steam
via the turbine, and seals or condensate phase separators
will introduce some radioactivity in gaseous form into the
building atmosphere. Consequently any release of radioac-
tivity in BWR is most likely by way of the airborne efflu-
ents traveling up the stack.90
In the PWR:
[T~he primary coolant passes through a heat exchanger
still in the liquid state. In such a system, escape of activity
is less probable and would proceed mainly through cracks
and defects in the primary loop piping, boiler tube defects,
and pump shaft and valve steam seal leaks. 91
The nuclear power plant, as the main element of the nu-
clear fuel cycle, generates an enormous amount of ra-
85. Id.
86. Id. at 13. A second type of radionuclide does not originate in the fuel.
They are the result of neutron activation of the corrosion and wear products of
the material composing the coolant loop. These materials can be different de-
pending on the type of reactor. See EicHoLz, supra note 29, at 174.
87. "MVarious structural materials in the primary loop, - pumps, values,
piping, the reactor vessel, and the like - corrode and erode under operating con-
ditions creating fine particulates... called crud." Stensvaag, supra note 35, at
15 n.48.
88. Id. at 14-15.
89. Id. at 15 n.48; EicmHoLz, supra note 29, at 175.
90. EicHHOLz, supra note 29, at 178.
91. Id.
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dionuclides that pose a serious danger to the environment if
they escape the containment of the reactor facility.92 Other
parts of the nuclear fuel cycle include the transportation of
nuclear materials and the management and transportation of
spent fuel and nuclear waste.93 Although these parts are not
associated with the production of new radionuclides, they can
also pose a danger to the environment.94 The main way to
protect the environment from pollution resulting from these
activities is the reliable isolation and containment of the radi-
oactive materials that are transported or deposited.9 5
The foregoing information demonstrates the diversity of
nuclear technology in the countries that use nuclear power
for electricity generation. An understanding of this technol-
ogy is necessary to approach the problem of the harmoniza-
tion or internationalization of nuclear safety standards. In
light of the diversity of nuclear technology, one would not be
surprised that "[n]o single set of detailed binding standards
could hope to encompass the differences in plant design, loca-
tion, operating philosophy, and legal and regulatory institu-
tions among countries."96
II. Present Responses of International Law to the
Problem of Radioactive Pollution: Regulation by
International Organizations
A. The International Atomic Energy Agency9 7
1. Introduction
Although the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA or the Agency) and the European Atomic Energy Com-
92. Id.
93. Id. at 477.
94. Id. at 546.
95. See NUCLEAR POWER, supra note 19, at 35-56; EImHHoLz, supra note 29,
at 477-500, 555-616. -See also BENEDICT Er A., supra note 3, at 457-626 (com-
prehensive discussion of fuel reprocessing and radioactive waste management).
96. Morris Rosen, A Formal International Nuclear Safety Regime: The First
Steps, IAEA BULL., Vol. 34 No. 2 1992, 8.
97. For more information on the Agency see generally LAWRENCE
SCHEImAN, THE INTERNATIONAL AToMIc ENERGY AGENCY AID WoRLD NUCLEAR
ORDER (1987); SZASZ, supra note 2.
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munity (Euratom) have different international legal status,
both represent the international community's cooperation in
the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and actively regulate nu-
clear energy. The next sections of this article will examine
these two agencies and the role they play in the development
of international regulation of nuclear energy.
The IAEA is one of the major organizations involved in
the international cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy.98 According to Article II of the IAEA's enabling stat-
ute (IAEA Statute), entitled "Objectives":
The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contri-
bution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity
throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able,
that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its
supervision or control is not used in such a way as to fur-
ther any military purpose.99
Although there are no provisions in the IAEA Statute
that explicitly provide for environmental protection from ra-
dioactive pollution, the Agency relies on the provisions of Ar-
ticle III of the IAEA Statute dealing with health and safety
matters to regulate this area.100 The fact that the drafters of
the IAEA Statute did not include a specific provision on envi-
ronmental protection is not surprising. The IAEA Statute
was negotiated and signed at the dawn of the nuclear age,
when the dangers of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (in-
cluding environmental hazards that could be associated with
it) were not as evident as those that were associated with the
production and use of nuclear weapons. Thus, the negotia-
tors of the IAEA Statute focused on the latter problem in or-
der to ensure that the growth in the field of nuclear energy
98. As of December 1993, there were one hundred twenty-four Member
States in the Agency. See IAEA BULL., Vol. 35 No. 4 1993, back inner cover
page.
99. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, STATUTE OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, As AMENDED UP TO JUNE 1, 1973 (1973) [here-
inafter IAEA STATUTE].
100. Id. at 5-9. See infra note 118.
1994]
17
202 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12
production and application would not lead to nuclear weapon
proliferation.
The drafters of the IAEA Statute entrusted the Agency
with powers that distinguished it from any other interna-
tional organizations, giving it a special legal standing among
international organizations. 10 The Agency's international
control is exercised through the use of safeguards. These
safeguards are procedures used to verify a State's compliance
with its international obligation to use nuclear energy solely
for peaceful purposes. 10 2 The IAEA Statute's provisions on
the IAEA's safeguards describe the procedures in general
terms. 0 3 The IAEA's safeguards are elaborated in two docu-
101. Id.
102. Id. at 26-29.
103. According to Article XII of the IAEA Statute, the Agency had the follow-
ing rights and responsibilities:
1. To examine the design of specialized equipment and facili-
ties, including nuclear reactors, and to approve it only from the
viewpoint of assuring that it will not further any military purpose,
that it complies with applicable health and safety standards and
that it will permit effective application of the safeguards provided
in this article;
2. To require the observance of any health and safety meas-
ures prescribed by the Agency;
3. To require the maintenance and production of operating
records to assist in ensuring accountability for source and special
fissionable materials used or produced in the project or
arrangement;
4. To call for and receive progress reports;
5. To approve the means to be used for the chemical process-
ing of irradiated materials solely to ensure that this chemical
processing will not lend itself to diversion of materials for military
purposes and will comply with applicable health and safety stan-
dards ... to require that special fissionable materials recovered or
produced as a by-product be used for peaceful purposes under con-
tinuing Agency safeguards...;
6. To send into territory of the recipient State or States in-
spectors ... who shall have access at all times to all places and data
and to any person... as necessary to account for source and special
fissionable materials supplied and fissionable products and to de-
termine whether there is compliance with the undertaking against
use in furtherance of any military purpose.. . with the health and
safety measures ....
Id. at 26-27.
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ments; the safeguards document 0 4 and the Non-Proliferation
Treaty safeguards document. 10 5
The main objective of the IAEA's safeguards, according
to the model agreement, is "[tihe timely detection of diversion
of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nu-
clear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and
deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection." 0 6
The basic IAEA's procedural safeguards are as follows: the
State in question shall keep accounting records of the nuclear
material in use in that State; the State shall provide the
Agency with reports based on these accounting records and
notice of all the inventory changes in the State; the IAEA
shall have a right to carry out on-site inspections to verify the
information contained in the reports, to check whether the
reports are consistent with the accounting records, and make
checks of the actual nuclear material. 10 7 These provisions
permit IAEA inspectors to enter the State and gain access to
its nuclear facilities and to the material used therein to deter-
mine whether use of these facilities and material is proper.'L 8
"IAEA safeguards are not self-executing and depend for im-
104. The first IAEA safeguards agreement was signed in 1960. These safe-
guards have been continuously revised and expanded. Id.
105. Id. In 1990 the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) was enacted, requiring each non-nuclear-weapon states who was a party
to the Treaty to make safeguard agreements with the IAEA which covered all
nuclear material even in for peaceful uses. To carry out this function, the
Agency devised a safeguards approach appropriate for the entire fuel cycle. The
Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required
in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1,
IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/153 (May 1971) [hereinafter INFCIRC/153].
106. Id. at 9 (emphasis in original).
107. Id. at 15-24.
108. Id. at 3. The model agreement for the application of the NPT safe-
guards provides that the Agency shall "secure the consent of the State to the
designation of Agency inspectors to that State." Id. But once the candidates for
inspectors are agreed upon they can come to that State without any additional
permission. Furthermore, the model agreement provides for unannounced in-
spections that can be carried out without advance notification and in accord-
ance with the principle of random sampling as a supplementary measure to
announced inspections. INFCIRC/153 supra note 106, at 23.
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plementation on an agreement between the agency and the
nation concerned." 10 9
Insofar as technical procedures are concerned, the
Agency's staff relies primarily on containment and surveil-
lance. 110 Essentially, the Agency's inspectors apply seals on
vessels containing nuclear material and install cameras
within nuclear facilities. The inspectors later examine the
seals and the videotapes to determine whether the nuclear
material has been removed from the facility.1"' Moreover, in-
spectors can weigh the nuclear material or take samples of it
for subsequent measurement and analysis." 2 It is these un-
precedented powers of international control that have given
the IAEA a special legal status in the United Nations system.
Unlike the United Nations' specialized agencies, that
have an independent responsibility in their respective areas
of activities and establish a relationship of cooperation and
coordination with the United Nations,"13 the relationship be-
tween the IAEA and the United Nations is based on a differ-
ent principle. According to the agreement between the IAEA
and the United Nations, the United Nations shares the re-
sponsibility for the activities in the area of nuclear energy
with the Agency." 4 As a result of this, the Agency unlike any
other international organization is entitled to have direct re-
course to the Security Council in cases where peaceful cooper-
ation is in jeopardy.115
109. SCHEINAN, supra note 97, at 127.
110. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, NEWS IN BRIEF SPECIAL ISSUE
(Apr. 1990).
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., D.L. Donohue & R. Zeisler, Behind The Scenes: Scientific
Analysis Of Samples From Nuclear Inspections In Iraq, IAEA BULL., Vol. 34 No.
1 1992, 25.
113. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, AGREEMENTS REGIS-
TERED WITH THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (1989).
114. Id.
115. This is exactly what happened when the Agency discovered that Iraq
was in violation of its obligation under the NPT. See INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC
ENERGY AGENCY, IAEA INSPECTIONS AND IRAQ'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES (Apr.
1992).
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2. The Regulation of Environmental Protection by the
IAEA
Although the IAEA Statute does not specifically provide
for environmental protection from radioactive pollution,
"more than 80% of the IAEA activities [are] in [the area of]
nuclear safety, and about half of those [are] in [the] fields of
nuclear power, nuclear fuel cycle, and nuclear applications,
[which] support environmental objectives." 116 The Agency's
environmental activities are based on the IAEA Statute's pro-
visions that relate to health and safety matters. 17 Article III
of the IAEA Statute, entitled "Functions," grants the Agency
authority to apply health and safety standards to any State's
nuclear activities by means of a special agreement with the
IAEA.3-1 This provision is clearly drawn along the same lines
as the IAEA Statute's provision on safeguards.11 9 Moreover,
116. INTERNATIONAL AToMIC ENERGY AGENCY: HIGHLIGHTS OF ACrIVITIES 24
(1990) [hereinafter HMGHLImHTS OF AcrivrriEs]. In general the activities of the
IAEA have developed into four major programs: "Nuclear Energy and the Fuel
Cycle", "Nuclear Applications", "Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection",
"Safeguards", the first three of these programs have environmental aspects. IN-
TERNATIONAL AToMiC ENERGY AGENCY, THE AGENCY'S PROGRAMME AND BUDGET
FOR 1991 AND 1992 XVII-XX (1990) [hereinafter THE AGENCY'S PROGRAMME FOR
1991-92].
117. IAEA STATUTE, supra note 99, at 7, 24, 26.
118. Article mI of the Statute reads as follows:
The Agency is authorized... tt]o establish or adopt, in consultation
and, where appropriate, in collaboration with the competent organs
of the United Nations and with the specialized agencies concerned,
standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of
danger to life and property (including such standards for labor con-
ditions), and to provide for the application of these standards to its
own operations as well as to the operations making use of materi-
als, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available
by the Agency or at its request or under its control or supervision;
and to provide for the application of these standards, at the request
of the parties, to operations under any bilateral or multilateral ar-
rangement, or, at the request of a State, to any of that State's activ-
ities in the field of atomic energy ....
Id. at 7.
119. The provision in Article I relating to safeguards states:
The Agency is authorized ... [to establish and administer safe-
guards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other mater-
ials, services , equipment, facilities, and information made
available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or
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the IAEA Statute provides that the Agency has the right to
carry out verification of compliance with the Agency's health
and safety standards, including health and safety inspec-
tions.120 The JAEA Statute clearly combines the Agency's
procedures in the area of health and safety and those relating
to safeguards. 121 In fact, some of the same procedures, in-
cluding the IAEA inspections, are prescribed for the purposes
of safeguards as well as health and safety.122 Additional evi-
dence that the drafters of the IAEA Statute envisioned a close
nexus between these Agency's functions, is the fact that the
Agency's regulations on inspectors explicitly includes verifi-
cation of health and safety matters within the scope of the
IAEA inspectors's duties. 23
There has not been the same type of "safeguards regime"
as far as health and safety matters are concerned. The
Agency's practice has departed from the letter of the IAEA
Statute. 2 4 This is not uncommon in the Agency's practice.' 2 5
Though the main function of the Agency in the area of health
control are not used in such a way as to further any military pur-
pose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any
bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or, at the request of a State,
to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy.
Id. at 6.
120. Id. at 26-28.
121. Id.
122. Article XII of the IAEA Statute deals with the procedures for safeguards
and for health and safety. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
123. The Agency's Inspectorate 1-3, IAEA Doc. GC(V)/INF/39 (Aug. 28 1961).
Agency inspectors for health and safety measures may perform in-
spections in accordance with each individual agreement, which may
necessitate:
(a) Tests of radiation sources, of radiation detection and
monitoring instruments and of other equipment or device in
connection with the use, storage, transportation or disposal as
waste of radiation sources;
(b) Examination of facilities wherein radiation sources are
used or stored, of waste disposal facilities and of all records on
which reports to the Agency are based, and (c) Examinations
related to the evaluation of the radiation exposure of persons
who have or may have been over-exposed.
Id. at 2.
124. SzAsz, supra note 2, at 454-56.
125. For example, Paul C. Szasz wrote the following about the way the
Agency's technical assistance had developed:
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and safety is to work out standards, it has simultaneously
developed safety review miSSions.126
The IAEA Statute empowers the Agency to adopt regula-
tions in the area of health and safety which in practice
amount to radiation protection and nuclear safety. 127 To de-
termine the legal force of these regulations it is necessary to
examine the provisions of Article III.A.6 of the IAEA Statute.
According to this Article, health and safety standards are au-
tomatically binding with respect to the Agency's own activi-
ties.128 In all other cases, standards become binding when
they are included in instruments that have a binding charac-
ter, e.g. international treaties or agreements.
a. Radiation Protection Regulation
The primary regulation issued by the Agency in this area
is "Basic Safety Standards for Radiation Protection" (Basic
Safety Standards).129 This regulation is aimed at the protec-
tion of human beings from the effects of radiation, but does
not contain measures for the protection of the environ-
The founders of the Agency did not initially foresee technical
assistance as one of the principal functions of the organizations
they were planning. However, as the group of States involved in the
drafting of the Statute was widened, first in the Working Level
Meeting and then in the Conference on the Statute, it became obvi-
ous that at least in the early years the provisions of technical
assistance would be of greater interest to most prospective Mem-
bers than the supply of fuel for reactor projects or the safeguards
and the health and safety functions.
It is therefore noteworthy that the expression "technical assist-
ance" does not appear in the Statute, especially since at the time of
its formulation this term had already gained currency and was well
accepted within the UN system.
Id. at 453-54.
126. See infra notes 130-37. These services are in fact called "inspections" by
some authors who write about international nuclear law. See, e.g., Alan E.
Boyle, Nuclear Energy And International Law: An Environmental Perspective,
60 BRTsH Y.B. INT'L L. 257, 265-66 (1989).
127. See infra notes 129-81 and accompanying text.
128. IAEA STATUTE, supra note 99, at 5-9.
129. INTERNATIONAL ATOcMo ENERGY AGENCY, BASIC SAFETY STANDARDS FOR
RADIATION PROTECTION, Safety Series No. 9, at foreword (1982) [hereinafter
Safety Series No. 91.
19941 207
23
208 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12
ment.130 The core of the regulation is the limitation of doses
for exposure from controllable sources. 1 1 The regulation au-
thorizes maximum permissible doses of radiation exposure
for three categories of human beings: workers, individual
members of the public, and the whole population. 32 The reg-
ulation provides that the genetic dose of radiation exposure to
the whole population over a period of thirty years shall not
exceed five rem and shall be kept to a minimum.3 3 The regu-
lation further states that the dose limit is the actual doses
received by individuals and varies depending on factors such
as difference in their age, size, metabolism, and customs. 134
In order to ensure compliance with the maximum per-
missible levels and dose limits, monitoring, surveillance, and
control methods should be established 35 Surveillance and
monitoring includes estimating radiation levels and environ-
mental contamination outside nuclear facilities. 36 Control
over the release of radioactive waste is also required to en-
sure conformity with the Basic Safety Standards. 3 7 How-
ever, the regulation does not set limits for radioactive
emissions, and does not identify principles for monitoring and
control. These procedures are included in other IAEA instru-
ments issued within the Agency's Safety Series.
One such monitoring procedure is covered within a sepa-
rate regulation titled a "Manual on Environmental Monitor-
ing in Normal Operation." 38 Limits for the release of
130. Id.
131. Id. at 2.
132. Id. For workers the maximum dose for the whole body is set at five rem
in any one year (rem is the unit of dose of ionizing radiation which gives the
same biological effect as that due to one roentgen of X-rays). Id. at 6. The maxi-
mum whole body dose for individual members of public should not exceed 0.5
rem per year. See Safety Series No. 9, supra note 129.
133. Id. at 8.
134. Id. at 9.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See generally, Safety Series No. 9, supra note 129.
138. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, MANUAL ON ENvIRoNrENTAL
MONITORING IN NoRMAL OPERATION, Safety Series No. 16 (1966). Other instru-
ments of this group include: INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, ENViRON-
MENTAL MONrTORING IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS, Safety Series No. 18 (1966);
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, MONITORING OF AIRBORNE AND LIQUID
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radioactive materials are set out in "Principles for Limiting
Releases of Radioactive Effluents into the Environment"139
and "The Application of the Principles for Limiting Releases
of Radioactive Effluents in the Case of Mining and Milling of
Radioactive Ores" published in the Agency's Safety Series.140
Other IAEA regulations on radiation protection that relate to
environmental protection include "Emergency Planning and
Preparedness for Nuclear Facilities,"14 1 "Emergency Plan-
ning and Preparedness for Accidents Involving Radioactive
Materials Used in Medicine, Industry, Research and Teach-
ing,"142 and "Regulation for the Safe Transport of Radioactive
Material."143
In the past few years, there have been important devel-
opments in the Agency's regulation of radiation protection.
The focus of the IAEA's work in this area from the 1950's to
the early 1980's was on the preparation of standards and
guidelines. In the late 1980's, the focus was shifted to the im-
plementation of environmental assessment, protection stan-
RADIOACTIVE RELEASES FROM NUCLEAR FACILITIES TO THE ENvmoNmFNT, Safety
Series No. 46 (1978); INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, OBJETlvEs AND
DESIGN OF ENVIRoNMENTAL MONITORING PROGRAMMES FOR RADIOACTIVE CON-
TAMINANTS, Safety Series No. 41 (1975).
139. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, PRINCIPLES FOR LIMITING RE-
LEASES OF RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS INTO THE ENVIRONMENT, Safety Series No.
77 (1986) [hereinafter Safety Series No. 77]. This publication is a complete revi-
sion of INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, PRINCIPLES FOR ESTABLISHING
LIMITs FOR THE RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS INTO THE ENVIRoNMENT,
Safety Series No. 45 (1978).
140. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, THE APPLICATION OF THE PRIN-
CIPLES FOR LIMITING OF RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS IN THE CASE OF THE MINING
AND MILLING OF RADIOACTIVE ORES, Safety Series No. 90 (1989). This document
provides general guidance on the application of Safety Series No. 77, "to the
setting of limits for the release of radioactive substances during the normal op-
eration of mining and milling of radioactive ores, as well as general guidance on
assessing the resulting individual and collective doses" of radiation. Id. at
foreword.
141. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, EMERGENCY PLANNING AND
PREPAREDNESS FOR NUCLEAR FACILITIES, Proceedings Series STI/PUB/701
(1986).
142. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, EMERGENCY PLANNING AND
PREPAREDNESS FOR ACCIDENTS INVOLVING RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS USED IN
MEDICINE, INDUSTRY, RESEARCH AND TEACHING, Safety Series No. 91 (1989).
143. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, REGULATION FOR THE SAFE
TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL AS AMENDED, Safety Series No. 6 (1990).
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dards and guidelines that would "ensurfe] coherence and
consistency from country to country."144 The implementation
process has been carried out through Subprogramme H.3:
Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment, Pro-
ject H.3.01, the Agency's goal for 1991-92 was "[t]o complete
the preparation of a comprehensive set of internationally rec-
ognized guidelines for the application of the principles con-
tained in the Agency's existing standards and guides on
limiting releases of radioactive effluents into the
environment. " 14 5
Within the aforementioned Subprogramme, "The Inter-
national Chernobyl Project" (the Project) was launched in
1990.146 The two main objectives of the Project are to "assess
the environmental and health situation in the areas of the
[then] Soviet Union [Russia, Ukraine and Byelorussia] con-
taminated by the Chernobyl accident and to evaluate the
measures taken by the [local] authorities .... ,,147 Some two
hundred scientists from twenty-five countries were involved
in the Project and almost fifty missions were carried out in
the Soviet Union under the Project.148
The International Advisory Committee set up to oversee
the Project made recommendations to the local authorities.
The committee members suggested that water sampling and
analytical techniques should be improved to comply with es-
tablished procedures. 149 As a result of the Project, Sub-
programme H.8: Radiological Consequences of the Chernobyl
Accident, was added in 1993 to the Agency's radiation protec-
tion programme. 150
Under this new Subprogramme, the Agency plans to is-
sue several new regulations for the control of radioactive
144. THE AGENCY'S PROGRAM M FOR 1991-92, supra note 116, at 212 (empha-
sis added).
145. Id. (emphasis added).
146. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, THE AGENCYS PROGRAMME
FOR 1993-94 104 (1992) [hereinafter THE AGENCY'S PROGRAMME FOR 1993-94].
147. Id.
148. Id. at 104-5.
149. INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY CoMMrrrEE, THE INTERNATONAL CHERNOBYL
PRoJECT, AN OVERVIEw 8-9 (1991).
150. THE AGENCY'S PROGRAm m FOR 1993-94, supra note 146, at 111.
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materials dispersed into the environment. The control of ra-
diation after such environmental contamination requires con-
tinued harmonization of methodologies for calculating,
establishing, and applying numerical guidelines for interven-
tion levels. 151 Subprogramme H.8 takes into account the new
ICRP recommendations and the knowledge acquired from the
Project.152 The IAEA "will continue [to harmonize] interna-
tional approaches and methods for modelling radionuclide
transport into the environment" and collect environmental
monitoring data. 53 Furthermore, the Agency will cooperate
with the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects
of Atomic Radiation, the World Health Organization, the
World Meteorological Organization and the Commission of
the European Communities. 54 Moreover, an approximate
forty percent increase in the IAEA's budget, as compared to
1992, is planned for these purposes. 155
Under Subprogramme H.4: Safe Transport of Radioac-
tive Material, the IAEA carried out a review of its "Regula-
tions for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material"
published in Safety Series Number 6, and its supporting
materials published in Safety Series Numbers 7, 37 and
80.156 In 1993-94, the Agency concentrated on "efforts to as-
sist Member States and international organizations in imple-
menting the transport regulations." 57
Within Subprogramme H.5: Emergency Planning and
Preparedness, the Agency proceeded to carry out its obliga-
tions under the Conventions on Early Notification of a Nu-
clear Accident and the Convention on the Assistance in Case
151. See generally 1990 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ICRP, supra note 17.
152. THE AGENCY'S PROGRAMME FOR 1993-94, supra note 146, at 111.
153. Id. at 106.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. THE AGENCYS PROGRAMME FOR 1993-94, supra note 146, at 107 (empha-
sis added).
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of a Nuclear Accident of Radiological Emergency. 158
Accordingly,
the Agency has set up a 24-hour Emergency Response Sys-
tem [ERS] .... The system was... put into operation on
18 January 1989 .... The ERS can respond rapidly and
authoritatively to emergencies by informing national au-
thorities about the accidents and by coordinating assist-
ance that Member States, the Agency and other
international organizations could provide. Communication
can be by telephone, telex or telefax, as well as through the
Global Telecommunication System... of the WHO [World
Health Organization], which can simultaneously transmit
voluminous data to many countries.' 59
Within Subprogramme H.6: Control and Safe Use of Ra-
diation Sources, Project H. 6.01, the Agency planned "to estab-
lish safety standards, codes and guides and develop technical
guidelines for the control and safe use of radiation sources, to
formulate recommendations for improvement in the design of
sources and devices and to assist Member States in the im-
plementation of these recommendations." 160 The 1993-94
Programme states that by 1994, the majority of these safety
standards, codes and guides will be completed. 161 It also
states that it is obvious from the Agency's experiences that
the situation in the Member States regarding the safety of
sources has not improved. 162
The preceding analysis of the IAEA regulations on radia-
tion protection illustrates that the principal regulation of the
Agency in this area, the Basic Safety Standards, does not es-
tablish limits for radioactive emissions into the environment.
Radioactive emissions are addressed in other IAEA regula-
tions.163 This demonstrates the Agency's recognition of an
158. Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, 25 Ir'L L.
MATERLs 1370 (1986); Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Acci-
dent or Radiological Emergency, 25 Isrr'L L. MATERIALS 1377 (1986).
159. HIGHLIGHTS OF AcTivrms, supra note 116, at 40.
160. THE AGENCYS PROGRAMME FOR 1991-92, supra note 116, at 220.
161. THE AGENCY'S PROGRAMME FOR 1993-94, supra note 146, at 109.
162. Id.
163. Safety Series No. 77, supra note 139.
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environmentalist approach to the regulation of radiation pro-
tection. The IAEA coverage of radiation protection through
its regulations is broader than the ICRP's recommenda-
tions.-6 4 Thus, within the IAEA, the notion of radiation pro-
tection becomes a truly media-based (in addition to being
biology-based) method of control over nuclear energy.1 65
The main corollary regarding the Agency's progress in
radiation protection is that in the future the Agency will
switch from issuing new guidelines to providing assistance to
Member States in "implementing the Agency's recommenda-
tions and guidelines."166
b. Nuclear Safety Regulation
One of the early regulations concerning environmental
issues of nuclear safety was the "Environmental Aspects of
Nuclear Power Stations."167 Regulatory suggestions in this
area were prepared as part of the Nuclear Safety Standards
programme of the Agency, relating to nuclear power plants,
and were published in the Agency's Safety Series in the form
of Safety Guides: "Operational Management for Radioactive
Effluents and Wastes Arising in Nuclear Power Plants,"1 68
"Quality Assurance During Operation of Nuclear Power
Plants," 69 "Reactor Coolant and Associated Systems in Nu-
clear Power Plants: A Safety Guide," 70 and others.' 7 '
164. See supra notes 17-27 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
166. THE AGENCY'S PROGRAMME FOR 1993-93, supra note 146, at 109 (empha-
sis added).
167. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIc ENERGY AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF
NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS, Proceedings Series STI/PUB/261 (1971).
168. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT
FOR RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS AND WASTES ARISING IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS:
A SAFETY GUIDE, Safety Series No. 50-SG-011 (1986).
169. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, QUALITY ASSURANCE DURING
OPERATION OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS: A SAFETY GUIDE, Safety Series No. 50-
SG-QA5 (Rev. 1) (1986).
170. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, REACTOR COOLANT AND ASso-
CIATED SYSTEMS IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS: A SAFETY GUIDE, Safety Series No.
50-SG-D13 (1986).
171. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, SAFETY ASPECTS OF FOUNDA-
TIONS OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS: A SAFET GUIDE, Safety Series No. 50-SG-
S8 (1986); INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, SAFETY IN DECOMMISSION-
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The Agency's priorities in the area of nuclear safety differ
from those in radiation protection. As discussed earlier, a
solid body of safety standards and related regulations in radi-
ation protection has been developed, and a significant degree
of unification has been reached. The principal problems with
international cooperation in radiation protection within the
Agency is the application, implementation and universal ad-
herence to existing principles. The Programmes of the
Agency reflect its inability to focus on the implementation of
nuclear safety standards, because the standards are still not
generally accepted.
Thus, the main objective of the Agency in the area of nu-
clear safety, according to Subprogramme Li: Basic Nuclear
Safety and Criteria, Project 1.1.01, is "to examine current
safety issues and to propose solutions for them with a view to
establishing commonly shared safety principles and objectives
... [and] [to advise on safety policy and criteria in order to
ensure a consistent approach to nuclear safety compatible
with evolving radiation protection philosophy and crite-
ria."17 2 The main focus of the Agency's 1993-94 Programme
in nuclear safety was "on improving national nuclear safety
regulatory systems by identifying good regulatory practices
and structures and providing assistance with their
implementation."173
The Agency's standards and guides issued in the area of
nuclear safety concern: Safe siting and design of nuclear in-
stallations aimed at developing criteria and techniques for
evaluating external hazards in nuclear installations; 74 iden-
tifying design or operational weakness that could jeopardize
plant safety; 7 5 estimating safety impacts of nuclear power
plant aging; 76 estimating operational safety of nuclear power
ING OF RESEARCH REACTORS, Safety Series No. 74 (1986); INTERNATIONAL
ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, SUrmARY REPORT ON THE POsT-AcCIDENT REVIEW
MEETING ON THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT, Safety Series No. 75-INSAG-1 (1986).
172. THE AGENCY'S PROGRAMME FOR 1991-92, supra note 116, at 232 (empha-
sis added).
173. TBE AGENCY'S PROGRAMME FOR 1993-94, supra note 146, at 119.
174. THE AGENCY'S PROGRAMME FOR 1991-92, supra note 116, at 235.
175. Id. at 236.
176. Id. at 237.
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plants aimed at formulating requirements ensuring the safe
and flexible operation of nuclear power plants;17 7 and collect-
ing, evaluating, assessing and disseminating information on
unusual events of safety significance. 17 8 In order to dissemi-
nate information on unusual events, a special system known
as the Incident Reporting System (IRS) was created.17 9
The Agency has initiated work on international nuclear
safety based on the September 1991 International Conference
on the Safety of Nuclear Power and the recommendations of
the IAEA General Conference.180 This work could lead to the
globalization and unification of nuclear safety standards and
approaches.' 81
c. Nuclear Waste Management Regulation
Recently, the Agency published a number of its regula-
tions in the area of nuclear waste management, especially in
its Proceedings Series and Technical Reports Series.18 2 The
Agency's major goals for the world nuclear community in the
1990's, with regard to the controversial topic of nuclear
waste, are to ensure that all nuclear facilities are environ-
mentally safe and benign, and continue to work out solid
plans in regard to nuclear waste.1 83 At the same time, the
177. Id. at 239.
178. Id. at 241.
179. THE AGENCY'S PROGRAMME FOR 1993-94, supra note 146, at 122. See
also E. Yaremy & K. Hide, A More Vigorous Approach to IAEA Safety Services,
IAEA BULL., Vol. 34 No. 2 1992, 19.
180. THE AGENCY'S PROGRAMME FOR 1993-94, supra note 146, at 119.
181. On a convention on nuclear safety, see infra notes 402-15 and accompa-
nying text.
182. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, MANAGEMENT OF AB-
NORMAL RADIOACTIVE WASTES AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, Technical Reports
Series No. 307 (1989); INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, MANAGEMENT
OF Low AND INTERMEDIATE LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTES 1988, Proceedings Se-
ries No. STI/PUB/784 (1989). More recent documents include: INTERNATIONAL
ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, UNDERGROUND DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES,
Proceedings Series No. STI/PUB/528 (1990); INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY
AGENCY, SrNG, DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF UNDERGROUND REPosrroRIs
FOR RADIOACTIVE WASTES, Proceedings Series No. STI/PUB/715 (1986).
183. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN IN-
TERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION MATTERS RELATING TO NUCLEAR SAFETY, Doc.
GC(XXXIV)/919, at 8-9 (1990).
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Agency argues that radioactive waste, in comparison with
wastes from other activities, arise in small quantities and the
hazards associated with them decrease over time.18 4 To illus-
trate this point, the Agency reasons that coal-fired power
plants, producing the same amount of electricity as a nuclear
power plant, will probably release, apart from huge quanti-
ties of C02, S02 and NOx, greater amounts of toxic heavy
metals than the nuclear power plants release in spent fuel. 8 5
Furthermore, the heavy metals remain toxic forever.'8 6 How-
ever, a number of countries have refused to rely on nuclear
power because of their lack of confidence in nuclear waste dis-
posal plans.' 87 The Agency has issued a number of recom-
mendations concerning standards and criteria for high-level
waste disposal and low-level waste disposal. For example, in
1989, the Agency published "Safety Principles and Standards
for the Underground disposal of high-level radioactive
waste."' 88
A deeper concern around the world is caused by marine
nuclear waste disposal. Since 1940, the marine environment
has been the disposal grounds for radioactive waste.'8 9 The
First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in
1958 addressed this issue. This discussion led to research
into the problem and issuance of the regulation, "Radioactive
Waste Disposal into the Sea," which was replaced in 1981.190
184. The International Atomic Energy Agency's Contribution to Sustainable
Development, A report prepared at the request of the IAEA general conference for
the presentation to the United Nations General Assembly (May 19, 1989) at 19
[hereinafter IAEA's Contribution to Sustainable Development].
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See Char & Csik, supra note 1, at 22. Sweden has passed legislation
prohibiting development of nuclear power in the country. Austria has also de-
cided not to pursue its nuclear power programme and to shut down its only
nuclear reactor. Id.
188. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, SAFETY PRINCIPLES AND TECH-
NICAL CRITERIA FOR THE UNDERGROUND DISPOSAL OF HIGH LEVEL RADIOACTIVE
WASTES, Safety Series No. 99 (1989).
189. IAEA's Contribution to Sustainable Development, supra note 184, at 20.
190. Id. at 21; See also, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, RADIOAC-
TIVE WASTE DIsPOsAL INTO THE SFA, Safety Series No. 5 (1962); INTERNATIONAL
ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, CONTROL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL INTO THE
MARwNE ENvIRONMNT, Safety Series No. 61 (1983).
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In 1984, the regulation called "Environmental Assessment
Methodologies for Sea Dumping of Radioactive Wastes" was
published.191
In 1975, the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pol-
lution by the Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (London
Dumping Convention)192 became effective. The London
Dumping Convention "gave the Agency specific responsibili-
ties for definition of high-level radioactive wastes unsuitable
for dumping at sea, and for making recommendations to na-
tional authorities in matters concerning the issuance of spe-
cial permits for the ocean dumping of radioactive wastes" the
IAEA has not prohibited. 93 The Agency has subsequently
revised its recommendations. 194 Presently, there exists a de
facto moratorium on the dumping of nuclear wastes at sea,
though according to non-official information, dumping still
takes place.
Another issue that requires a response from interna-
tional law is the transboundary movement of nuclear wastes.
In 1990, the Agency established a Code of Practice on the In-
ternational Transboundary Movements of Radioactive Waste
(the Code).' 95 The main principles set forth in the Code in-
clude the following: States should exercise their right to reg-
ulate movements of radioactive waste into, from or through
their territories in accordance with the Code; a State should
readmit the radioactive waste that was transferred from it in
non-compliance with the Code; and States should cooperate
to prevent movements that are not in compliance with the
191. INTERNATIONAL ATOMC ENERGY AGENCY, ENviRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT
METHODOLOGIES FOR SEA DulImNG OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES, Safety Series No.
65 (1984).
192. Convention On The Prevention Of Marine Pollution By Dumping Of
Wastes And Other Matter, 1140 U.S.T.S. 377.
193. IAEA's Contribution to Sustainable Development, supra note 184, at 21.
194. The latest was published in 1986. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY
AGENCY, DEFINITION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE CONVENTION ON THE PRE-
VENTION OF MARINE POLLUTION BY DUMPING OF WASTES AND OTHER MATTER
1972, Safety Series No. 78 (1986 ec).
195. General Conference Resolution of2l September 1990 on Code of Practice
on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste, 30 INT'L L.
MATEmALS 557, 560-64 (1991).
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Code. 196 The provisions of the Code are designed to be in-
cluded within bilateral, multilateral or regional agreements
of States.197
In addition to the adoption of its standards on radiation
protection, nuclear safety, and waste management, the
Agency has developed the relatively new activity of sending
experts, at the request of a State, to diagnose the state of af-
fairs of radiation protection, nuclear safety and waste man-
agement in that State. These missions have been referred to
by some authors as the "Agency's safety inspections."198 This
term is applied to such institutions of the IAEA as the Radia-
tion Protection Advisory Team, Operational Safety Review
Team, Assessment of Safety Significant Events Team, Waste
Management Advisory Programme and Technical Review
Programme. These services are becoming increasingly im-
portant as the demand for them, by both developing and de-
veloped States, grows every year.1 99 But these needs are
being only partially met due to the adverse effects of the zero-
growth budgeting of the Agency over the past few years.200
3. Concluding Analysis
Despite extensive activities in the regulation of nuclear
safety and radiation protection, the Agency's regulation suf-
fers a number of serious legal shortcomings. These regula-
tions must be considered and revised to provide a better
standard for nuclear energy relating to the protection of the
environment from radioactive pollution.
IAEA standards and regulations that could form a basis
for international legislation, in either radiation protection or
in nuclear safety, have no binding legal force. However, there
is a difference in the stages of the development of standards
in these areas. In radiation protection, the IAEA has reached
a stage of sufficient universality and general applicability,
which will allow the Agency to focus on the implementation
196. Id.
197. The author is unaware of any such agreements in force.
198. See Boyle, supra note 126, at 265-66.
199. THE AGENC'S PROGRAmm FOR 1993-94, supra note 146, at 112.
200. Id.
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss1/10
NUCLEAR ENERGY
and application of standards.20' In nuclear safety, the IAEA
standards still require further unification before the issue of
implementation and application can be raised.
The difference in the level of unification and acceptability
between the standards in those two areas appear to be
largely due to differences in the technical nature of the stan-
dards themselves. While radiation protection is attained by
means of setting admissible exposure doses and levels, 20 2 nu-
clear safety addresses safety requirements for the design and
construction of nuclear reactors.203 As the material in the In-
troduction demonstrates, there are several principal types of
nuclear reactors used for power generation. Moreover, in dif-
ferent countries, varied models of the same basic reactor type
are found.20 4 The state of development in nuclear technology
used for peaceful purposes throughout the world does not fa-
cilitate the unification and global acceptability of the safety
standards. In an attempt to address this problem, the IAEA
is presently working on Subprogramme 1.8: Safety of Future
Nuclear Power Plants.20 5 Presumably, a unification and
globalization of nuclear safety standards should be preceded
by a unification of the nuclear technology used for nuclear
power generation.
One significant feature of the Agency's advisory mission
is that it applies IAEA standards and compares the actual
situation to them upon "inspection" of the safety or radiation
condition of the facility in question. It thereby creates a body
of international quasi-legal requirements in the respective
areas. At the same time, there is a principle distinction be-
tween the safety review missions and the Agency's inspec-
tions that ensure peaceful, as opposed to military, uses of
nuclear energy. In order to obligate a State to use its nuclear
facilities and materials for peaceful purposes and to apply the
Agency's safeguards, that State has to enter into a special
201. See supra notes 129-66 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 58-96 and accompanying text.
205. Tim AGENCy'S PROGRAMME FOR 1993-94, supra note 146, at 127.
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agreement with the Agency.20 6 In order to make the Agency's
health and safety standards a binding basis for inspection, a
State must so provide in a relevant agreement.20 7
Nevertheless, there are substantial differences between
the practical implementation of those two IAEA functions. In
order for a State to acquire nuclear materials and equipment,
it has to undertake to use the said materials and equipment
for peaceful purposes. However, it does not have to make a
similar promise with respect to health and safety if the State
wishes to obtain and maintain a nuclear facility.
One explanation for this can be found in the fact that
there are significant technical and technological differences
between the Agency's safeguards with respect to peaceful
uses of nuclear power and its measures in respect to health
and safety. Applying IAEA standards to peaceful use of nu-
clear energy is a comparatively uncomplicated and inexpen-
sive task.208 The technical measures applied by the Agency
to perform its safeguards are relatively uncomplicated.20 9 In-
spection of nuclear facilities to determine their adherence to
nuclear safety standards appears to be a far more compli-
cated and cumbersome procedure. This is mainly due to the
differences in the designs of nuclear reactors and other nu-
clear facilities in various countries which lead to a variety of
potentially dangerous circumstances. In the absence of uni-
form and binding safety standards, and in the reality of the
wide diversity of nuclear technology used for peaceful pur-
poses, safety "inspections" only take place on a case by case
basis.
206. IAEA STATUTE, supra note 99, at 6.
207. Id. at 7. See also supra note 118 and accompanying text.
208. SzAsz, supra note 2, at 660.
209. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
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B. The European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom)
1. Introduction
a. The State of Radioactivity in the Euratom
Member States
In the Member States of the Euratom, just as in other
States, the quantity and composition of radioactive emissions
varies from power station to power station over time.210
Power stations emit radioactive substances in varying forms,
such as "noble gases [like] krypton-15 and argon 41, as radio-
active halogens... as radioactive particulates and as tritium
and carbon-14."211 However, these radioactive emissions are
minimal when compared to those emitted by nuclear fuel
reprocessing plants.212 For example, the reprocessing plants
in "Sellafield [England] and La Hague [France] each release
more krypton-85 than all the nuclear power stations in [the
Community] combin[ed]." 213 The Sellafield and La Hague
reprocessing plant's tritium emissions are generally greater
than those from power stations.214 Sellafield's discharges
furnish a major input of radioactivity to the Irish Sea.21 5 The
La Hague emissions also furnish an input to the English
Channel.2 1 6 Some of this radioactivity is deposited on the sea
floor, while some gets carried into the Atlantic and the North
Sea.217
Recently, improvements in nuclear technology have
caused a reduction of emissions from power stations.2 18 How-
ever, nuclear energy production has increased with more
power stations operating.21 9 Consequently, atmospheric
210. THE STATE OF THE ENvmoNMENT IN THE E.C., supra note 11, at 164.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. THE STATE OF THE ENVioINmENT IN THE E.C., supra note 11 at 282.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 164.
219. Id.
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emissions of radioactivity from power stations has remained
the same, or possibly increased slightly.220
b. The International Legal Status of the Euratom
The international legal status of the Euratom is derived
from its position as one of the three international organiza-
tions221 which form the European Communities (EC).222 The
Maastricht Treaty223 established the European Union which
is founded on the EC.224 This international entity has re-
ceived a lot of publicity because of the dramatic developments
associated with these treaties. Much has been written on the
SEA225 and the Maastricht Treaty and their impact on Euro-
pean environmental policy.226
While the Maastricht Treaty mandates that, "the High
Contracting Parties establish among themselves a European
Union... founded on the European Communities, [and] sup-
plemented by the policies and forms of cooperation estab-
lished by this Treaty," it has not completely merged the three
European Communities.22 7 The Declaration on Civil Protec-
tion, Energy and Tourism, adopted by the Conference on the
Maastricht Treaty states, "the Commission declares that
220. THE STATE OF THE ENvmoiRom r IN THE E.C., supra note 11, at 164.
221. These three organizations are; the European Coal & Steel Community,
the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Commu-
nity. TREATmS ESTABLISHING THE EuROPEAN Comm rmTIES, supra note 18.
222. Id. at 823-51.
223. Treaty on European Union, 31 INT'L L. MATERIALS 253-373 (1992) [here-
inafter The Maastricht Treaty].
224. Id. at 255. On the legal status of the European Communities see, e.g.,
J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991); Philip
Allott, The European Community is Not the True European Community, 100
YALE L.J. 2485 (1991); Philippe Sands, European Community Environmental
Law: The Evolution of a Regional Regime of International Environmental Pro-
tection, 100 YALE L.J. 2511 (1991); Henry G. Schermers, Comment on Weiler's
"The Transformation of Europe," 100 YALE L.J. 2525 (1991).
225. See TRATIFs ESTABLISHInG THE EURoPEAN COMMUnrIES, supra note
18.
226. See, e.g., Christian Zacker, Environmental Law of the European Eco-
nomic Community: New Powers Under the Single European Act, 14 B.C. hnTL
& Comp. L. REv. 249 (1991); Frederick Abbott, Regional Integration and the
Environment: the Evolution of Legal Regimes, 68 CH.-KENT L. REV. 173 (1992).
227. TH L MAASTmIcT TREATY, supra note 223, at 255.
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Community action in those spheres [i.e. in civil protection,
energy and tourism] will be pursued on the basis of the pres-
ent provisions of the Treaties establishing the European
Communities."228 Thus, recognizing the individual communi-
ties remains valid.
2. The Regulation of Environmental Protection by
Euratom
According to the Treaty establishing the European
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom Treaty), Euratom has
the responsibility "to contribute to the raising of the standard
of living in the Member States and to the development of re-
lations with the other countries by creating the conditions
necessary for the speedy establishment and growth of nuclear
industries." 229 Like the IAEA Statute, the Euratom Treaty
does not contain specific provisions for protecting the envi-
ronment from radioactive pollution. The Euratom Treaty
gives the Community the power to create "Uniform Safety
Standards" aimed at protecting the health of the general pub-
lic and workers health, as well as, ensure the application of
the Uniform Safety Standards. 23 0 Article 30 of the Euratom
Treaty defines the phrase "basic standards" to mean: "(a)
maximum permissible doses compatible with adequate
safety; (b) maximum permissible levels of exposure and con-
tamination; [and] (c) the fundamental principles governing
the health surveillance of workers."23 3 This definition covers
only matters of radiation protection, and does not address nu-
clear safety. In fact, on several occasions, the Commission of
the European Communities (Commission) has emphasized
that its responsibilities under the Euratom Treaty "are con-
fined to radiation protection aspects, [and] to the exclusion of
technological safety problems."2 32
228. Id.
229. TREATIES ESTABLiSHING THE EUROPEAN ComiUNTIES, supra note 218,
at 623.
230. Id. This entitlement is further developed in a separate chapter of the
Euratom Treaty entitled "Health and Safety." Id. at 644-47.
231. Id. at 644.
232. EuR. PARL. Written Questions with Answers, No. 1983/88, 1989 O.J. (C
187) 30.
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a. Radiation Protection Regulation
According to the Euratom Treaty, it is the responsibility
of the Commission to establish the Uniform Safety Standards
for radiation protection.233 Once the Commission establishes
the Uniform Safety Standards, the Council of the European
Communities (Council),23 4 with the aid of European Parlia-
ment,23 5 adopts them.23 6
The Euratom Treaty entrusts significant powers to the
Communities' governing bodies in establishing the Uniform
Safety Standards. While the Commission and the Council
play the primary role in creating the Uniform Safety Stan-
dards,237 it is the Commission which must ensure that the
233. See Zacker, supra note 226, at 253.
The Commission is the quasi-executive organ of the Communi-
ties.... The Commission represents and defends the interests of
the Community vis-a-vis the member states and ensures the proper
functioning and development of the common market. This duty
obliges the Commission to guarantee that the Community institu-
tions and member states apply the EEC Treaty [as well as the
Treaties establishing the other two Communities] and secondary
legislation, to issue recommendations and opinions... to negotiate
international agreements .... The Commission may initiate legis-
lative proposals ....
Id.
234. The most important legislative body of the Communities is the Council.
It makes final decisions on most European Community legislation. Id. at 253-
54. See generally J. ANDREw ScHIuicKuA & THoMAs MCMAHON, INTERNA-
TIONAL ENVmoNmENTAL LAw AND REGULATION E.C.6 (1993) [hereinafter
SCHLICKMAN & MCMAHON].
235. "The European Parliament is not a traditional representative body be-
cause its 518 representatives represent more than one people and lack legisla-
tive powers. The Parliament acts principally as a supervisory body of the
Commission of the European Communities (Commission) and an advisory body
to the Council." Zacker, supra note 228, at 255. At the same time as long as the
Members of the Parliament are now directly elected, it can be said that this
institution is in fact intended to represent the peoples of the Community. See
ScIIcKAN & MCMAHON, supra note 234, at E.C.6, 7.
236. The principal institutions of the Euratom, the Council and the Commis-
sion, were merged with those of the other European Communities pursuant to
the Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities (Merger Treaty) on April 8, 1965. D. LAsOK & J.W. BRIDGE,
LAw & INSTTUTIONS OF THE EuRoPEAN COMmuNTIES 18 (5th ed. 1992).
237. Zacker, supra note 226, at 253-54. Title III of the Euratom Treaty
promulgates the provisions governing the institutions of the Community. Pow-
ers of the Council and of the Commission are specified in section I and H, re-
40http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss1/10
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Member States comply with the Uniform Safety Stan-
dards.238 For example, the Commission, in accordance to Ar-
ticle 33, reviews the Member States' draft provisions and
issues recommendations with the intent to create uniform
provisions throughout the Community.23 9 These recommen-
dations are issued prior to the adoption of the respective
standards by the national authorities. 240 The Commission
has the additional right to enter the Member States' environ-
mental radioactivity monitoring facilities in order to ensure
the Member States' compliance with the Uniform Safety
Standards.241
The Council first adopted Uniform Safety Standards in
1959, in the form of a Council Directive (Directive).242 They
were subsequently modified in 1976, 1980 and 1984243 to re-
spectively under chapter I of the institutions of the Community. See also,
TREATIEs ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 18.
238. TREATiEs ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN CoMMuNrrms, supra note 18, at
690-95.
239. Id. at 645.
240. Id. at 646.
241. Id.
242. 1959 O.J. (L 11) 221. The principal forms of the Community legislation
are defined in Article 161 of the Euratom Treaty and are made up of Regula-
tions, Directives and Decisions. Unlike Regulations, that are directly applica-
ble in particular Member States without those States having to take any action,
the Directives are not directly applicable. In the normal course of events, a
Member State must implement a particular Directive by bringing in appropri-
ate national provisions by the date specified in the Directive. However, in cer-
tain circumstances, a Directive that has not been implemented can be directly
effective after the date on which it should have been implemented. The essen-
tial difference between a Regulation and a Directive is that, in case of a Direc-
tive, the Member States has a right to choose the form and methods for
attaining the objectives of the Directive. See TREATIES ESTABLISHNG THE EURO-
PEAN CoMMuNrrIES, supra note 18, at 704-05. See also ScHucm & McMA-
HON, supra note 234, at E.C.10,11.
243. Council Directive of 1 June 1976 Laying Down the Basic Safety Stan-
dards for the Health Protection of the General Public and Workers Against the
Dangers of Ionizing Radiation 79/579, 1976 O.J. (L 187) 1 (Euratom); Council
Directive of 27 March 1979 Amending Directive 75/579/Euratom Laying Down
the Basic Safety Standards for the Health Protection of the General Public and
Workers Against the Dangers of Ionizing Radiation 79/343, 1979 O.J. (L 83) 18
(Euratom); Council Directive of 15 July 1980 Amending the Directives Laying
Down the Basic Safety Standards for the Health Protection of the General Pub-
lic and Workers Against the Dangers of Ionizing Radiation 80/836, 1980 O.J. (L
246) 1 (Euratom) [hereinafter Council Directive 80/836]; Council Directive of 3
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flect and incorporate scientific developments in the area of ra-
diation protection and the recommendations of the ICRP.
The Directive established the maximum safe level of human
exposure to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.244 Although
the Directive's primary purpose is to protect people, it is for-
mulated in a way that helps to preserve the environment.
Article 6 of the Directive stated,
The limitation of individual and collective doses resulting
from controllable exposures shall be based on the following
general principles:
(a) every activity resulting in an exposure to ionizing
radiation shall be justified by the advantages which it
produces;245
(b) all exposures shall be kept as low as reasonably
achievable. 246
The latest version of the 1980 Directive (with minor amend-
ments in 1984) categorizes all persons who may potentially
be affected by nuclear radiation into the following groups: (1)
exposed workers;2 47 (2) apprentices and students; and (3)
members of the public.248 The maximum safe level of expo-
sure differs for each group.2 49
September 1984 Amending Directive 80/836/Euratom as Regards the Basic
Safety Standards for the Health Protection of the General Public and Workers
Against the Dangers of Ionizing Radiation 84/467, 1984 O.J. (L 265) 4
(Euratom) [hereinafter Council Directive 84/467].
244. Council Directive 80/836, supra note 243 at 6.
245. This provision was amended in Council Directive 84/467 to state, "the
various types of activities resulting in an exposure to ionizing radiation shall
have been justified in advance by the advantages which they produce." Council
Directive 84/467, supra note 243, at 5.
246. Council Directive 80/836, supra note 243, at 6.
247. Exposed workers are defined as "persons subjected, as a result of their
work, to an exposure liable to result in annual doses exceeding one-tenth of the
annual dose limits laid down for workers." Id. at 4.
248. Id. at 6-8. Members of the public are defined as, "individuals in the
population excluding exposed workers, apprentices and students during their
working hours." Id.
249. Id.
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The limits for exposed workers are 50 mSv250 (5 rems)
per year for whole body exposure.251 The dose limitations for
apprentices and students vary according to their age,252 with
lower limits for younger people.253 For the general public, the
dose limit for whole body exposure is 5 mSv (0.5 rem) per
year.254 The dose limit for partial body exposure, for the gen-
eral public, shall be 5 mSv (0.5 rem) per year, with the aver-
age dose in each of the organs or tissues involved not
exceeding 50 mSv (5 rem) per year.255
In evaluating the effects of the 1980 Directive's stan-
dards on preserving and protecting the environment, this au-
thor's primary concern is the impact on the general public.
The protective measures for exposed workers, apprentices
and students might not include measures to protect the envi-
ronment at large. Measures for exposed workers, apprentices
and students include various local shielding, such as, special
clothes, gloves and hats, where protection of the public at
large inevitably requires protection of the environment be-
cause the public is generally only affected by environmental
radiation.
Article 13 of the 1980 Directive provides that "[e]ach
Member State shall ensure that the contribution to the expo-
sure of the population as a whole from each activity is kept to
the minimum amount necessitated by that activity, taking
account of the principles set out in Article 6 (a) and (b)."2 56
250. Sievert, symbol: Sv, is "A unit of radiation dose which gives a measure
of the effect of radiation on its target." DOOLEY & KIRKPATmICK, supra note 30,
at 153.
251. Council Directive 80/836, supra note 237 at 6. "In case of partial body
exposure, the effective dose limit shall be 50 mSv (5 reins) in a year; the average
dose in each of the organs and tissues involved shall not exceed 500 mSv (50
reins) in a year." Id. at 7.
252. Id.
253. The limitations for persons of this category aged eighteen years or over
are the same as for exposed workers. The limitations for apprentices and stu-
dents who are between sixteen and eighteen years old are set lower than that-
namely the dose shall be equal to the three-tenths of the annual dose limits for
exposed workers. The dose limits for apprentices and students who are younger
than sixteen are those that are set forth for members of the public. Id.
254. Id. at 8.
255. Council Directive 80/836, supra note 243, at 8.
256. Id.
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The 1980 Directive, establishes radiation exposure limits for
different groups based on their potential risk of exposure, yet
fails to provide for the environmental protection explicitly.
However, it does enumerate certain principles and guidelines
for the Member States to follow in protecting their environ-
ment at large. Thus, it provides that the effective dose limits
set forth for exposed workers and members of the public shall
be taken into account when calculating the limits of annual
exposure as set out in Annex III of the 1980 Directive. These
annual limits are then used to derive radiational concentra-
tion limits for the air and water.257 This procedure has been
included in Annex III of the 1980 Directive. 258 Thus, Annex
III sets forth limits of annual intake, through inhalation of
radionuclides, for exposed workers and members of the pub-
lic. 259 In addition, Annex III sets forth the derived limit of
concentration of radionuclides in the ambient air.
Certain provisions in the 1980 Directive do relate to envi-
ronmental protection. For instance, Title I, "Definitions,"
contains terms that are distinctly environmentally signifi-
cant.260 "Radioactive contamination," for example, is defined
as "the contamination of any material, surface or environ-
ment or of a person by radioactive substances .... -261 The
concept of radioactive contamination is reiterated in Title VII
which applies to the protection of the population.2 62 Title VII
requires, not only surveillance of the public's health, but also:
"a) assessment[s] of external exposure, indicating, where ap-
propriate, the quality of radiation in question; [as well as] b)
assessment[s] of radioactive contamination, indicating the
257. Council Directive of 3 September 1984 Amending Directive 80/836/
Euratom as Regards the Basic Safety Standards for the Health Protection of
the General Public and Workers Against the Dangers of Ionizing Radiation An-
nex 1I 84/467, 1984 O.J. (L 265) 10 (Euratom) [hereinafter Annex mI 84/467].
See generally Council Directive of 15 July 1980 Amending the Directives Laying
Down the Basic Safety Standards for the Health Protection of the General Pub-
lic and Workers Against the Dangers of Ionizing Radiation Annex 11 80/836,
1980 O.J. (L 246) (Euratom) [hereinafter Annex III 80/836].
258. Id.
259. Annex m1 80/836, supra note 257, at 26.
260. Council Directive 80/836, supra note 243, at 4.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 13.
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nature and the physical and chemical state of the radioactive
contaminants and their activity and determination of their
concentration."2 63 While the 1980 Directive requires the as-
sessment of radioactive contamination in the environment, it
does not provide a standard with which the assessments can
be compared. 264 Thus, the assessments of the radioactivity in
the environment are to ensure compliance with the basic
doses and levels for the protection of the general public and
workers set forth in the 1980 Directive. After analyzing the
provisions of the 1980 Directive, it is clear that although they
focus on protecting people, and consider the protection of the
environment a subsidiary means for protecting people, the
provisions provide a basis for future work on the protection of
the environment.
1. Implementation of Euratom Legislation
Although the 1980 Directive is binding on the Member
States, 265 the Community's structure places the responsibil-
ity on the Member States to incorporate the Community's leg-
islation into their respective laws and administrative acts.2 66
That is why the requirements of the 1980 Directive are ad-
dressed to all Member States in general, and not to their rele-
vant authorities, e.g. nuclear regulatory bodies.267 From this
it follows that the Member States must set up the relevant
263. Id. at 13-14.
264. Id.
265. See generally. TRFTrIEs ESTABLSHING THE EUROPEAN COMIAUNTIES,
supra note 218.
266. Id.
267. See Council Directive 80/836 supra note 243. See also Commission Rec-
ommendation 92/444 of 26 July 1991 Application of the Third and Fourth
Paragraphs of Article 33 of the Euratom Treaty, Annex, 921444, 1991 O.J. (L
238) 33 (Euratom)[hereinafter Article 33]. Another area in which the commis-
sion has the power to make recommendations is emergency planning. Even
though emergency planning is not a field in which the Commission can take
binding measures, it has a right to review the respective legal provisions of
Member States and recommend steps to make them more uniform throughout
the whole Community. As long as the procedures of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of
Article 03 are designed for the harmonization of the legislation of the Member
States, the Member States are requested in the Recommendation not to finally
adopt any draft provisions until the period of three months granted to the Com-
mission under paragraph 4 of Article 33 has elapsed. Thus, the Commission
1994] 229
45
230 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12
domestic structures to implement the Euratom legislation. 268
The 1980 Directive specifies neither the organs nor the proce-
dures that the Member States should establish to comply
with its provisions.269 This system often leads to problems in
the implementation of the Community's legislation.
As previously mentioned, the latest amendments to the
Directive were promulgated by the Community on July 15,
1980 and September 3, 1984.270 Certain Member States
found it difficult to adapt and supplement their laws in ac-
cordance with the latest amendments by the scheduled dead-
lines.2 71 Therefore, to ensure full implementation of the 1980
Directive, the Commission requested that all the Member
States272 evaluate the progress of the incorporation into their
national laws.27 3
Along with implementation, enforcement of compliance
with the Directives is also in the hands of the Member
States.27 4 Article 45 of the 1980 Directive reads:
Each Member State shall establish a system of inspection
to supervise the protection of the health of the population,
to interpret, in terms of the effects on health, the results of
the assessments provided for in Article 44 (3) [the assess-
ment of the doses received by the specific groups of workers
and the population, as well as radioactive contamination of
the environment] and to check compliance with the dose
limits laid down on Article 12 [dose limits for members of
the public]. 275
would have a real chance to influence the activities of the Member States in
emergency planning. Article 33, supra at 32.
268. Council Directive 80/836, supra note 243, at 13-14.
269. Eum PARL., Written Questions with Answers, No. 129/87 (1987) O.J. (C
315) 18 [hereinafter No. 129/87]. The Member States were given eighteen
months to revise their laws and administrative rules accordingly. Id.
270. See supra, note 243 and accompanying text.
271. No. 129/87, supra note 269, at 18.
272. Id. The Commission has not approached the United Kingdom and
Greece, who have already adopted the new measures laid down in the Directive
as amended. Id
273. Id. at 18. Special attention has been paid to Spain and Portugal, which
have been allegedly lagging behind in implementing the Directives. Id.
274. Council Directive 80/836, supra note 243, at 14.
275. Id.
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Under this system questions arise such as, what happens
if a Member State seems to be in violation of the basic stan-
dards? and what measures are available to the Community, if
violations do occur? For instance, Spain was accused, by
other Member States, of not complying with the 1980 Direc-
tive.276 The Spanish government notified the Commission of
national measures it was taking to implement the 1980 Di-
rective. After considering those measures, the Commission
initiated infringement proceedings for failure to comply with
the 1980 Directive.277 Meanwhile, the Spanish authorities
sent the Commission a draft royal decree which solved the
problems in the way the Commission suggested.278 In this
instance, the problem was solved, though only after interven-
tion from the Commission.
2. Enforcement by the Commission
Now suppose the 1980 Directive had been successfully
adopted by all of the Member States, however there are in-
stances of violations, the question remains: does the Commu-
nity have any significant control over the enforcement of the
1980 Directive? The best way to answer this question is to
look at a hypothetical instance when a State has violated the
standards.
One would expect that since the Community plays a sig-
nificant role in the establishment of the standards, the inci-
dents that involve a violation or may result in such violation
should be reported to the Community. However, neither the
1980 Directive itself nor any subsequent documents require
the Member States to report any incidents to the Community.
It should be noted, that Article 45 requires that, "[a]ny acci-
dent involving exposure of the population must be notified as
a matter of urgency, when the circumstances so require, to
neighboring Member States and to the Commission."279
276. Eum. PARL, Written Questions with Answers, No. 2275/91 and 2276/91,
1992 O.J. (C 162) 15-16.
277. Id.
278. EuR. PAL, Written Questions with Answers, No. 2986/91 and 2987/91,
1992 O.J. (C 162) 39.
279. Council Directive 80/836, supra note 243, at 14.
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Thus, notification is only required when accidents are in-
volved.280 Even with respect to the notification of accidents
there is a qualification, "when the circumstances so re-
quire."281 This qualification raises many questions. What
kind of circumstances require notification? Does it mean that
only accidents that result in exceeding the Standards require
notification? What if the accident does not result in exceed-
ing the Standards for members of general public, but does
cause exposure to workers? Is it up to the State to determine
whether notification is required? Could or should other
States be invited to take part in the decision-making process?
The 1980 Directive does not answer these questions.
The application of the 1980 Directive has demonstrated
that when an accident does not involve a violation of the
Standards, it is within that Member State's discretion to de-
cide whether the incident should be reported to the Commis-
sion.28 2 If a State does not report an incident, then the
Commission assumes that the incident is not important.28 3
For example, when the Commission received a written ques-
tion about an incident in 1982, in which a container at Garig-
liano power station in Campania, Italy, leaked radioactive
water, it replied, "[o]bviously the event in question was not
regarded as important enough to warrant notifying the
Commission."28 4
Furthermore, the Commission trusts the Member States
to accurately measure the amount of radioactivity in the en-
vironment. For instance, answering a written question by a
Member of the European Parliament concerning emergency
shutdowns of the Cattenom nuclear reactor in France, the
Commission's representative stated, "[i]t is for Member
States to decide what controlled discharge levels can be toler-
ated, always provided that the Community's standards are
respected, in particular, the resulting exposure must remain
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. EuR. PARL., Written Questions with Answers, No. 1776/82, 1983 O.J. (C
100) 28, 29.
283. See id.
284. Id.
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as low as reasonably achievable below the limits stipu-
lated."28 5 As far as the shutdown in question was concerned,
the representative of the Commission stated,
[wihile incidents at nuclear installations do not require to
be reported to the Commission, a weekly summary is re-
ceived for France from the Service Central de Protection
contre les Rayonnements Ionisants. Since the relevant
summary makes no mention of any incident at Cattenom
on 12 March, any such incident is assumed to be of no par-
ticular significance.28 6
At present, even incidents involving safety-system activated
shutdowns are not required to be reported to the Commis-
sion.28 7 When an incident on the Fessenheim nuclear power
station in France occurred, the Commission giving another
interpretation to Article 45 of the 1980 Directive, said:
[Alccording to information contained in a bulletin pub-
lished by the French Ministry concerned, the quantity of
radioactive gases released through the stack was less than
a thousandth of the annual permissible quantity, and leak-
ing liquids were recovered by the building's drainage sys-
tem. Exposure of the population was therefore absolutely
minimal, and Article 45 does not apply. As far as the Com-
mission is aware, the Baden-Wurtemberg measuring
equipment has not detected any environmental effects.288
Though there is no requirement of notification of all nu-
clear incidents within the Community, the Commission and
the Parliament have been developing an information ex-
change system with respect to nuclear incidents or unusually
high levels of radioactivity within the Community.2 8 9 Their
285. EuR. PARL., Written Questions with Answers, No. 1124/87, 1988 O.J. (0
263) 6.
286. Id.
287. EUR. P AL., Written Questions with Answers, No. 116/87, 1987 O.J. (C
315) 17.
288. EuR. PARL., Written Questions with Answers, No. 345/86, 1987 O.J. (C
143) 4 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
289. See, e.g., Draft Proposal for a Council Decision on a Community System
of Rapid Exchange of Information in cases of Unusually High Levels of Radioac-
19941 233
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efforts have been reinforced since the Chernobyl accident. In
June of 1986, the Commission sent an outline communication
to the Council on the consequences of the Chernobyl acci-
dent.290 The Commission then transmitted to the Council,
the Parliament and the "Economic and Social Committee"291
a communication "on the development of Community meas-
ures for the application of Chapter III of the Euratom Treaty,
'Health & Safety.'" 292 The Communication was accompanied
by a draft proposal for a Council Decision on a Community
system of rapid information exchange in cases of unusually
high levels of radioactivity or a nuclear accident.293 The
Commission also suggested that the Community should act
in conjunction with the IAEA, which at that time was work-
ing on the Conventions on early notification and on assist-
ance in case of a nuclear accident. 294
Since the Community is still working on the issues of no-
tification and the exchange of information by its Member
States, a question has arisen as to whether the Community is
entitled to inspect the nuclear facilities of the Member States,
to assure compliance with the Directives. Article 35 provides
for the Commission's "right of access" to monitoring facilities.
It states that:
Each Member State shall establish the facilities neces-
sary to carry out continuous monitoring of the level of radi-
tivity or of a Nuclear Accident, Annex I, COM(86)434 final at 1 [hereinafter
Rapid Exchange of Information].
290. Outline Communication from the Commission to the Council on the
Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident, COM(86)327 final.
291. 'The Committee is an advisory body made up of 189 representatives
from employer, worker, and other interest groups." ScInCKMAN & MCMAHON,
supra note 234, at E.C.-7.
292. Commission Communication to the Council, The Development of Com-
munity Measures for the Application of Chapter III of the Euratom Treaty
'Health and Safety', COM(86)434 final [hereinafter Application of Chapter I].
293. See Rapid Exchange of Information, supra note 289.
294. The Commission and the Parliament adopted a whole set of documents
regarding new measures that the Euratom should undertake in connection with
the environmental dangers of nuclear energy that became more vivid as a result
of the Chernobyl accident. Given that these documents are pertinent to many
of the issues raised and discussed in this work, they will be analyzed sepa-
rately. See infra notes 354-359 and accompanying text.
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oactivity in the air, water and soil and to ensure
compliance with the basic standards.
The Commission shall have the right of access to such
facilities; it may verify their operation and efficiency.295
The provisions of the second paragraph of Article 35 have
been dormant for most of the time that Euratom has existed.
After the Moscow Treaty296 banned atmosphere, underwater
and outerspace nuclear weapons testing, the level of radioac-
tivity in the atmosphere was reduced substantially, and the
Commission declined to perform further inspections.297 The
Commission also declared that the measurement technique
had been harmonized throughout the Community and there
was no need to carry out inspections on all the monitoring
facilities.298 This is yet another excuse to not perform the Ar-
ticle 35 inspections. The Commission has deemed it sufficient
to receive and process data from the Member States.299 The
295. TRmATiES ESTABLISHING THE EuRoPEAN CowaUNrrms, supra note 18, at
646.
296. This treaty was signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963.
297. EUR. PAPL., Written Questions with Answers, No. 1844/79, 1980 O.J. (C
156) 61 [hereinafter No. 1844179].
298. Id.
Since 1958 the Commission has exercised its right to inspect
the national facilities established to monitor the level of environ-
mental radioactivity. Today, however, the fact that there are virtu-
ally no more nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, and
consequently radioactive fallout from this source has been substan-
tially reduced, has, together with the harmonization of the mea-
surement techniques, decreased the practical value of inspecting
such facilities.
The Commission has considered it more appropriate to direct
the monitoring of levels of radioactivity... towards the measure-
ment of background radioactivity and.., an examination of the
effluents from nuclear installations, such as nuclear power stations
and reprocessing plants ....
Id.
299. EuR. PARL., Written Questions with Answers, No. 1845/79, 1980 O.J. (C
150) 39.
The Commission is regularly informed by the Member States of the
position regarding environmental radioactivity in their territories;
the information notified under Article 36 of the Euratom Treaty re-
lated to the results of the measurements of fallout levels together
with those of the radioactivity in the air, water and milk. These
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issue of the Commission's inspection, similar to the issue of
the notification of nuclear incidents, was reviewed by the
Community after the Chernobyl accident.300 The European
Parliament,30 ' as well as certain Member States urged the
Community, through the Commission, to introduce
mandatory inspections of radiation levels in the Commu-
nity.302 Responding to these recommendations, the Commis-
sion included in its communication "on the development of
the Community measures for the application of Chapter III of
the Euratom Treaty"3 03 a proposal to explore the idea of a
Community Inspection Force in the radiation protection
field.30 4
data form the basis of annual reports published by the Commission
and addressed to the Parliament.
Id. "The Commission [also] publishes annual data on the operation of all the
nuclear power stations in the Community in the series 'Energy and Industry'
(theme 4-series C). This is issued by Eurostat." EuR. PARL., Written Ques-
tions with Answers, No. 2002/88, 1989 O.J. (C 187) 31.
300. See infra notes 376-80 and accompanying text.
301. In general, there is no obligation on the part of either the Council or the
Commission to take into account the Parliament's opinion. "However, since the
adoption in 1986 of the SEA, in some instances, the Parliament has enhanced
powers whereby its approval is needed to ratify a decision by a qualified major-
ity rather than unanimity." SCHLmCKMAN & MCMAHON, supra note 234, at E.C.-
7.
The Maastricht Treaty contains a specific provision that relates to the Par-
liament's powers as far as the Euratom Treaty is concerned. According to Title
IV of the Maastricht Treaty entitled "Provisions Amending the Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Atomic Energy Community," the Parliament "may, acting
by a majority of its members, request the Commission to submit any appropri-
ate proposal on matters on which it considers that a Community act is required
for the purpose of implementing this Treaty." THE MAAsTmcHT TREATY, supra
note 223, at 314.
302. EuR. PARL., Written Questions with Answers, No. 321/90, 1990 O.J. (C
266) 25.
303. EUR. PARL., Written Questions with Answers, No. 230/87, 1988 O.J. (C
61) 08.
304. Id. the Commission has the power to undertake independent investiga-
tion when the Member States expect it and request it. For example, on several
occasions concern was expressed within the Euratom about the excessive tri-
tium discharges into the River Meuse from the nuclear station at Chooz, France
and Tirange, Belgium. The Commission set up a group of experts to examine
the radiological impact of the discharges in the Meuse in 1983. The group sub-
sequently published a series of reports based on the results of the measure-
ments that it undertook. See EuR. PARL., Written Questions with Answers, No.
604t87, 1987 O.J. (C 351) 43.
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The Commission has the power to undertake independ-
ent investigation when the Member States expect it and re-
quest it. Also, the Commission has been involved in
monitoring of the environment after the Chernobyl acci-
dent,30 5 by "participat[ing], along with other international
organizations, in the evaluation by the IAEA of the conse-
quences of the Chernobyl accident in the [former Soviet
Union] requested by the Soviet authorities."30 6 The Commis-
sion collaborates with the Chernobyl Center for International
Research,30 7 in an effort to learn about the situation in con-
taminated areas and create strategies that will help mitigate
the consequences. 308
In connection with the above analysis of the Commis-
sion's activities in measuring radioactivity in the environ-
ment, and its Article 35 powers to conduct inspections of
monitoring facilities in Member States, one question re-
mains: How could the Commission's activities in this regard
be effective if there are no unified and enforceable standards
on acceptable levels of radioactivity in the ambient environ-
ment? This lacuna would seem even deeper if the Commis-
sion's activities in monitoring the Member States'
environment and inspecting their monitoring facilities were
expanded.
The powers of the Commission to make recommenda-
tions to the Member States in the area of radiation protection
may be useful in making up for this lacuna. There are sev-
eral types of recommendations that the Commission can send
to Member States.30 9 According to the provisions of Article
305. EUR. PARL., Written Questions with Answers, No. 784191, 1992 O.J. (C
55) 6.
306. Id. at 7.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Articles 33 and 38 provide for the Commission recommendations in the
area of radiation protection. Article 38 generally deals with the Community
infringement action, and the recommendations provided for in the first para-
graph of this article if interpreted in the context of this article, constitute a
preliminary step that the Community can take before it actually initiates an
infringement action against a State that allegedly does not observe safety stan-
dards. (Paragraph 1 of Article 38 states that "[tihe Commission shall make rec-
ommendations with regard to the level of radioactivity in the air, water and
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33 paragraph 4 of the Euratom Treaty, the Commission
makes recommendations regarding the safety standards of
the Member States.310 Paragraph 2 of Article 33 empowers
the Commission to make appropriate recommendations for
harmonizing the provisions applicable in the field of health
and safety. Although this could significantly enhance the role
of the Commission in developing Community radiation pro-
tection regulations, the Commission has failed to take advan-
tage of the powers under paragraph 2. Using paragraph 2,
the Commission could, together with the Member States,
work toward establishing uniform radiation protection stan-
dards.311 In addition, paragraph 2 could serve as the basis
for creating standards for acceptable radioactivity levels in
the environment.3 12
The preceding analysis demonstrates that forward think-
ing decision-making can help develop the Euratom Treaty, to
provide for more far-reaching legislation. An eloquent exam-
ple of this is the subsequent secondary legislation adopted in
soil.") TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN CoMMuNTEs, supra note 18, at
611.
The Commission also relied on the provisions of Article 124 paragraph 2,
which issued recommendations on special problems of radiation protection. Id.
310. The Commission has recognized that experience has been gained in the
application of the third and fourth paragraphs of Article 33 of the Euratom
Treaty. See Commission Recommendation, 1991 O.J. (L 238) 31-32 [hereinafter
Commission Recommendation].
311. Whereas specific recommendations issued under Article 33, of the
Euratom Treaty give the Commission a level to influence future provisions in
the Member States, general recommendations according to para. 2, can focus on
the existing state of legislation in the Member States. In this way, on the basis
of Article 33 of the Euratom Treaty and of the Directives issued pursuant to
Articles 30 et seq. of the Treaty, the Commission can, with the aid of general
and specific recommendations, work together with the Member States towards
the establishment of uniform European radiation protection standards. TREA-
TIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNrrIES, supra note 18.
312. See TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN CommuNrrIEs, supra note
18. Within its radiation protection legislation, the Community has developed
certain provisions for emergency planning. According to Article 45 of the Basic
Standards Directive, Member States should develop emergency plans on their
own; the Commission is not involved in this process. Id.
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regard to Article 37 of the Euratom Treaty. This Article is
directly related to the matters of nuclear safety.313
b. Nuclear Safety Regulation
On its surface, Article 37 deals with nuclear waste. Ac-
cording to the Commission's Recommendation on the Applica-
tion of Article 37 (Recommendation), 14 nuclear waste is
interpreted as any form of radioactive substance.3 15 This is
an incredibly broad interpretation of the term "nuclear
waste." Apparently it includes; nuclear waste proper (high-
level and low-level), spent fuel, and radioactive effluents
emitted in the process of the utilization of nuclear energy
(both in normal operation and in case of an accident).31 6 Ac-
cording to the Recommendation, the "general data" to be sub-
mitted to the Commission under Article 37 in connection with
waste disposal should include: The site of the nuclear instal-
lation (geographical, topographical and others); the plant (the
design and main features); the release of radioactive sub-
stances in normal operation; the unplanned releases of radio-
active effluents; and, environmental monitoring.3 17 Since the
Recommendation gives such a broad interpretation of Article
37, it can compensate for the absence of Treaty provisions es-
tablishing uniform nuclear safety standards in the Commu-
nity. In addition, as the Recommendation contains
provisions requiring that the Member States submit data
about radiation protection measures to the Commission, it
can assist the Commission and the Member States in harmo-
nizing their radiation protection standards.
Nuclear safety, unlike radiation protection, is not cov-
ered by the Euratom Treaty.318 In the Commission's re-
313. NucLEAR ENERGY LAW AFTER CHERNOBYL 43-44 (Peter Cameron et al.
eds., 1988) [hereinafter NUCLEAR ENERGY LAW AFTER CHERNOBYL].
314. Commission Recommendation of 7 December 1990 on the Application of
Article 37 of the Euratom Treaty, 91/4, 199 O.J. (L 6) 16-24 (Euratom) [herein-
after Recommendation].
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. TREATIES ESTABLISHInG THE EURoPEAN CoxmNrrms, supra note 18 at
646-47.
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sponse to a written question from a Member of Parliament
about the results of a safety test at the French-Belgium nu-
clear power station at Chooz, France, the Commission replied
that:
Since the safety of nuclear installations is the responsibil-
ity solely of the Member States, the results of the safety
tests which are carried out by the bodies approved by the
Member States concerned are communicated only to the
operators and the competent authorities of that Member
State; hence they are not notified to the Commission.31 9
Moreover, on a number of occasions the Commission stressed
that nothing concerning nuclear safety is within its
jurisdiction.320
At the same time, Euratom as a whole has not com-
pletely excluded nuclear safety from its sphere of influence.
On July 22, 1975, the Council adopted a resolution that in-
cluded a program for future cooperation within the Euratom
on nuclear safety issues.3 21 In the resolution, the Council
agreed, inter alia, to take a course of action, through the
Commission, toward the harmonization of safety stan-
dards.322 The stated goal being to provide protection, to both
the population and the environment, from the possible harms
of radiation from nuclear activities.3 23 The Council tried to
console those who were apprehensive that the more uniform
the nuclear safety standards would become lower. It stated
that this course of action should "assist the development of
trade on the understanding that such harmonization should
319. EuR. PARL., Written Questions with Answers, No. 604/87, 1987 O.J. (C
351) 43 (emphasis added).
320. Including technological safety of nuclear installations. EuR. PARL.,
Written Question with Answers, Nos. 370/87 and 378/87, 1987 O.J. (C 351) 24-
25; EuR. PAL., Written Question with Answers, No. 1983/88, 1989 O.J. (C 187)
30.
321. COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF 22 JuLY 1975 ON THE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS OF
NuCLEAR SAFETy, 1975 O.J. (C 185) 1.
322. Id. at 1.
323. Id.
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not involve any lowering of the safety level already attained
."324 The stages of harmonization included:
(1) accounting for industrial development in the area of
high-power nuclear reactors; (2) comparing the require-
ments used; (3) balancing similarities and differences; (4)
promulgating recommendations pursuant to the Euratom
Treaty; and (5) submitting draft provisions to the
Council.325
In 1984, the Parliament adopted a resolution in which it
requested an immediate departure from studying the matter,
in order for the Commission to prepare binding standards in
the areas of physical safety installations, for submission to
the Council.3 26 Unfortunately, the resolution's call to draw
uniform safety standards "as soon as possible," has gone un-
heeded. Thus, the Community has squandered a chance to be
a model of mandatory standards in nuclear safety for the rest
of the international community. However, it appears that the
Community, being a union with a high degree of homogeneity
and the necessary structure of organs with far-reaching pow-
ers, is the right place to look for unified and mandatory inter-
national requirements of this kind.
Despite the vigorous tone of the Resolution, cooperation
in the area of nuclear safety is proceeding at a slow pace.3 2 7
It has proved to be an area in which the Member States are
particularly reluctant to put any internationally agreed lim-
its upon their sovereignty.328 Prior to the Chernobyl acci-
dent, cooperation and regulation in this area was at a stand
still.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 1-2.
326. Council Resolution of 30 March 1984 on Closing the Procedure for Con-
sultation of the European Parliament on the Communication from the Commis-
sion of the European Communities to the Council Concerning the Community's
Role as Regards the Safety of Nuclear Installations and the Protection of Public
Health and the Draft Resolution on Trans-Frontier Radiological Problems, 1984
O.J. (C 117) 189.
327. See infra note 381 and accompanying text.
328. NucLEAR ENERGY LAw AFTER CHERNoBYL, supra note 326, at 44.
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c. Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety After
Chernobyl
i. Radiation Protection
The Community's activities in the field of environmental
protection, was spurred by Chernobyl. In its report to the
Council and the European Parliament, the Commission
stated that it,
has undertaken recently an examination of current Com-
munity instruments and measures relevant to radiological
protection. This was in part prompted by incidents and ac-
cidents that occurred over the last few years, but mainly
brought about by events following the Chernobyl accident.
As announced in its Framework Communication, the Com-
mission has concluded that existing measures for the appli-
cation of Chapter III are in need of review.329
In 1986, the Commission submitted a communication on the
"Development of Community Measures for the Application of
Chapter III of the Euratom Treaty," to the Council, the Par-
liament and the Economic and Social Committee.330 This
communication mainly concerned matters of radiation protec-
tion,331 because Chapter III of the Euratom Treaty does not
cover nuclear safety issues.332 The communication outlined
the problems faced by the Commission when implementing
the Chapter III provisions of the Euratom Treaty, and ad-
dressed necessary steps, on the part of both the Member
States and the Commission, to ensure effective cooperation in
the realization of all the possibilities provided in Chapter
111. 33 3 The Commission was frustrated by the fact that after
the Chernobyl accident, the Member States came up with
conflicting data on radiation levels.3 34 This data "did not al-
329. The Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Accident and its Consequences in
the Framework of the European Community, COM(86)607 final at 20 (emphasis
added).
330. See Application of Chapter II, supra note 292.
331. Id.
332. TREATIEs ESTABLISHING THE EURoPEAN Comwmrras, supra note 18.
333. Application of Chapter III, supra note 292, at 2-9.
334. Id. at 5.
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low a proper assessment of potential hazard[s] from airborne
activity and, subsequently, from contaminated foodstuffs.
Sampling procedures varied, results were expressed in differ-
ent units and formats and data were frequently delayed and
incomplete."33 5  The Commission concentrated on the
problems that it was facing in the areas of: (1) harmonizing
radiation protection; (2) monitoring radioactivity in the envi-
ronment; (3) disposing radioactive waste; (4) transporting ra-
dioactive materials; and (5) emergency planning and
supporting activities. 336
The Commission faced difficulties in harmonizing radia-
tion protection because of a conflict between the need for fre-
quent amendments to the standards to keep up with scientific
developments and the inability of Member States to reach
agreements promptly:
The length of time needed to agree on revisions is so long
that, before they can be implemented, revisions are al-
ready out of date.... Frustrated by the slow progress in
amending safety provisions, some Member States have
preferred to adopt national solutions. This has led to a di-
vergence of national laws enforcing the Basic Standards
which has in turn made more difficult the task of the Com-
munity to harmonize radiation protection. 337
The Commission concluded that this has led to weak provi-
sions for radiation protection.338
The Commission noted that in the area of monitoring the
environment, in the early years of the Euratom Treaty, it had
exercised its Article 35 right of access to the facilities in the
Member States to verify their operation, but later discontin-
ued this procedure.3 39 However, as the Commission pointed
out, "there w[ere] cases where the discharges from an instal-
lation c[ould] be detected in the environment of a neighbour-
ing Member State," necessitating "independent verification of
335. Id.
336. Id. at 2-3.
337. Id. at 5.
338. Application of Chapter I, supra note 292 at 5.
339. Id.
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the discharges and environmental contamination levels
. -*"340 The Commission's Recommendation on the applica-
tion of Article 37 of the Euratom Treaty, requires that Mem-
ber States provide the Commission with data on radioactive
discharges at regular intervals.3 41 The Commission pointed
out that an overview of this data, which it publishes regu-
larly, "is often incomplete due to missing data returns from
the Member State."342
In emergency planning and supporting activities, the
Commission noted that "the independent attitude" taken by
Member States has limited the Commission's work.343 In
this context the Commission referred to a communication
that it submitted to the Council along with a Council Resolu-
tion on "emergency planning and contamination of rivers and
seas" that was never adopted.34
The Commission, relying on the reassessment of the pro-
gress made in the areas discussed above, created a number of
suggestions. Stating that there was a need to reassert the
objective of the Euratom Treaty and its goal to establish
safety standards in radiation protection, with an emphasis on
uniformity and harmonization. 345 In order to expedite the
process of adopting the 1980 and 1984 Directives as national
legislation (originally scheduled to be completed by April
1984), the Commission decided to use all its Euratom Treaty
powers, including legal proceedings. 346
The Commission stated that it was not completely satis-
fied with the legal form of Directives on the standards. It
said:
The siting of many nuclear plants close to the border of
neighbouring Community countries and the ease with
which radioactive emissions can travel through air and
water make this essential both to protect public health and
340. Id. at 7.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Application of Chapter M, supra note 292, at 8.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 10.
346. Id.
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to establish public confidence. In order to achieve harmo-
nization or even uniformity it may be necessary in [the]
future to use other Community instruments such as a Reg-
ulation or a Council Decision. This explains why the Com-
mission chose the form of a regulation as being particularly
appropriate in the context of limits for foodstuffs. 3 4 7
This demonstrates the Commission's newly adopted environ-
mentally-oriented approach to radiation protection. In this
vein, it discussed the need for the Community to monitor
levels of radioactivity in the environment. It also discussed
enforcement tools, such as the establishment of a Community
Inspection Force, which was proposed by the Resolutions of
the European Parliament and the Member States.348 The
Commission concluded that to have any effect, an inspection
force would need to be large.3 49 Evidently, establishing such
a force would not be feasible and could possibly duplicate the
work of national inspections.
As part of its future activities in emergency planning and
a rapid information exchange system, the Commission again
referred to its powers of inspection under Article 35.350 The
Commission emphasized that it was aware of and was con-
tributing to the activities of the IAEA on the drafting of the
early notification and assistance conventions. 351
On the whole, the communication seemed to touch upon
the most pressing issues concerning the protection from radi-
oactive pollution, that became even more vivid after the
Chernobyl accident. Yet, the Commission remained con-
servative about certain points. For example, the Commission
said that there were no uniform limits on radioactive dis-
charges throughout the Community, but failed to make a con-
347. Id. The Council Regulation set general tolerance levels for specific
classes of foodstuffs. See also Commission Regulation 1675/86 of 30 May 1986
Fixing the Premiums to be Added to the Import Levies on Rice and Broken rice,
Annex II, 1986 O.J. (L 146) 8, 10.
348. Application of Chapter III, supra note 292, at 12.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 13.
351. Id.
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clusion that the Community needed to establish harmonized
uniform standards limiting radioactive discharges.3 52
The Commission issued this communication on August
20, 1986.35 3 On April 8, 1987, the European Parliament, in
the wake of the Chernobyl accident, adopted a series of reso-
lutions on nuclear energy.3 54 One resolution reflected the
Parliament's dissatisfaction with the Commission's inaction
in remedying "obvious shortcomings in the Euratom Treaty"
revealed by the Chernobyl accident.3 55 The resolution called
for a revision of the Euratom treaty, including, in particular:
(b) the establishment of common standards for radio-
active emissions;
(e) an improvement of the basic norms for radiation
protection which must immediately be transformed into
the law of the Member States;
352. Id. Instead it drew up the following rather vague passage:
The derivation of authorized discharge limits for nuclear in-
stallations is at present left to the Member States. The Framework
Communication broaches the concept of Community emission stan-
dards and the Commission will, as part of its work in this area, hold
consultations to review existing practices. It is desirable that emis-
sion standards should be based on the application of the present
state of technology and the Commission will take account of this in
its review of emission standards.
Application of Chapter III, supra note 292, at 13.
353. Id.
354. Resolution on the Follow-Up Report on the 1995 EC Energy Objectives,
1987 O.J. (C 125) 86; Resolution on the Future of Nuclear Energy, 1987 O.J. (C
125) 88 [hereinafter Future of Nuclear Energy]; Resolution on the Problem of
Contamination of Foodstuffs Following the Chernobyl Disaster, 1987 O.J. (C
125) 91; Resolution on the Reaction of the Community to Chernobyl, 1987 O.J.
(C 125) 92; Resolution on the Safety of Nuclear Power Stations and the Ques-
tion of Mutual Assistance and Compensation, 1987 O.J. (C 125) 94 [hereinafter
Mutual Assistance]; Resolution on the Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident
and on the Outline Communication from the Commission of the European Com-
munities to the Council on the Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident, and
the Communication from the Commission of European communities to the
Council on Community Actions to be Taken in Response to the Chernobyl Acci-
dent, 1987 O.J. (C 125) 96 [hereinafter Resolution on Consequences of
Chernobyl Accident].
355. See Resolution on Consequences of Chernobyl Accident, supra note 354.
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(g) the establishment of a Community Inspectorate for
monitoring the application of Community standards, in-
cluding standards on radiation protection.3 56
The Parliament's resolution is much more outspoken about
the establishment of the Community's common standards for
radioactive emissions.35 7
ii. Nuclear Safety
The Chernobyl accident incited the work of the Commis-
sion, and the Community as a whole, in the area of nuclear
safety. After the Council adopted a resolution on technologi-
cal aspects of nuclear safety on July 22, 1975,358 and before
the Chernobyl accident occurred, little progress was made in
this area. After the Chernobyl Accident, several resolutions
were passed by the Parliament concerning nuclear safety.
An interesting contrast results from the comparison of
standpoints between the Parliament and the Commission on
matters of nuclear safety. In its communication, the Com-
mission says that it performed harmonization/intercom-
parison of national standards on nuclear safety even before
the Council Resolution of July 22, 1975 came into exist-
ence.3 59 It had always been aware that the harmonization
would benefit both safety and market openings.360 Harmoni-
zation opens markets by standardizing component design,
manufacture and quality control.361 Furthermore, harmoni-
zation of material specifications, result in removal of techno-
logical obstacles motivated by safety concerns.362
The Commission states that the process of harmoniza-
tion of safety criteria, codes, and standards, in relation to all
types of nuclear power installations, has had problems as
356. Resolution on Consequences of Chernobyl Accident, supra note 354, at
97.
357. Application of Chapter IH, supra note 292.
358. Technological Problems of Nuclear Safety, COM(87)96 final [hereinafter
Technological Problems].
359. Id.
360. Id. at 4.
361. Id.
362. Id.
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well as achievements. 363 For example, one of the problems
has been identifying similarities and differences in the safety
regulation of light water reactors due to the rapid develop-
ments in the areas of nuclear power installation and regula-
tory practices.3 64 However, the Commission praises the
achievements made in the field of liquid metal fast breeder
reactors which have taken place in part because of the har-
monization work begun prior to commercial application, and
in part because of the fast reactor developments, due to the
joint effort in research by the Member States. 365 The Com-
mission found this encouraging, given the "complexity of the
subjects to be treated and the large number of participants"
with different interests, such as; utilities, constructors, li-
censing authorities, and research organizations. 366
The Parliament, in one of the resolutions adopted after
the Chernobyl accident, stressed that "even the existing but
modest competencies of the Euratom concerning safety had
been largely neglected."3 67 With that in mind, the Parlia-
ment should draft a plan as to how the Euratom Treaty
should be amended and how it should respond to the new re-
quirements. The main themes the amendments should ad-
dress include:
(a) establishment of common safety standards for nuclear
installations [completely new provisions to be included into
the Treaty]; (b) the establishment of common standards for
radioactive emissions [which would complement a lot of
the Commission's activities]; (c) the consultation proce-
dure[s] for the siting of nuclear power stations in frontier
regions; ... (f) the establishment of common information
and control systems in case of nuclear incidents; (g) the es-
tablishment of a Community Inspectorate for monitoring
363. Technological Problems, supra note 358, at 11.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 12.
366. Id. at 12. The Commission emphasizes, "([flurthermore, most of these
organizations are reluctant to envisage a central role of the Community on regu-
latory matters, beyond that enshrined in Chapter III of the Euratom Treaty." Id.
(emphasis added).
367. Resolution on Consequences of Chernobyl Accident, supra note 354, at
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the application of Community standards for reactor safety
368
Compared to the position of the Commission, the Parliament,
as is obvious from this plan, is taking a more radical ap-
proach to create co-operation between the Euratom Member
States in radiation protection and nuclear safety. If such a
plan is adopted, many pending issues in these areas would be
removed from Euratom's agenda.
When discussing the issue of nuclear safety standards,
the Parliament stated that it,
[d]eplores the fact that there are no binding international
standards on the safety of nuclear power stations, [and
that it] [clonsiders that the non-binding standards set in
the NUSS Programme (Nuclear Safety Standards) estab-
lish a basis on which mandatory international rules could
be drawn up; stresses the importance also of bringing the
East European countries within the ambit of these stan-
dards; considers that, at the very least, binding safety
standards must be introduced within the EEC by means of
appropriate addition to the Euratom Treaty and that such
standards should not be based on compromise but on the
strictest provisions currently in existence.369
On the border installations issue, the Parliament called for a
very stringent provision, requiring that before a power plant
is operated 100 kilometers from the border of an adjacent
Member State, that adjacent Member State must consent to
the operation of the plant.3 70 If the adjacent Member State
does not consent, the power plant is not to be operated.371
On the issue of nuclear safety inspections, the Parlia-
ment insisted that nuclear reactors could not be constructed
in the European Community before the safety of their design
has been verified by competent, international experts, paying
attention to environmental factors. 72 It went on to say that
368. Id.
369. Mutual Assistance, supra note 354, at 94.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. See id. at 95.
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it approved of the IAEA's use of OSART missions and called
on all states to provide access to their nuclear power plants
for examination by IAEA experts.3 73 The Parliament ad-
dressed some of the issues raised in these resolutions prior to
their adoption. Moreover, some of those issues had at one
time prompted negative reactions from the Member States or
their representatives. 374
For example, arguing against setting up a Community
Inspection Force, the government experts from France stated,
"En]either the word nor the spirit of this Article could be inter-
preted in favour of setting up a 'Community Inspection
Force.! ,375 For a diametrically opposed opinion, this author
cites a work on Euratom, written by a group of Belgian au-
thors immediately after the organization was set up in 1958.
The book was published before the Directive was in its initial
form, and thus the interpretation of the Euratom Treaty con-
tained in the book is an interpretation of the "word" and the
"spirit" of the Treaty. The book interprets the provisions of
Article 35 to mean that:
The Commission's right of 'access to such [monitoring] fa-
cilities' and its right 'to verify their operation and effi-
ciency,' implies that the Commission can send special
inspectors to perform these functions. This provision al-
373. Id.
374. For example, to consider the issue of setting up a Community inspection
force, a meeting of national experts was held on 15 November 1985. The report
adopted by the meeting stated inter alia: the nine delegations present were
unanimous in opposing the setting up of a Community Inspection Force as en-
visaged in the Resolution of the Parliament. Present record-keeping procedures
were judged satisfactory and any failure by operators to respect the procedures
in full, as occurred at Sellafield (in November 1983 an accident resulting from
operational errors occurred on a German reprocessing nuclear plant at Sel-
laield) could not be prevented by a Community Inspection Force which would
be expensive to operate and would serve only to duplicate existing national ar-
rangements. Support was expressed by some delegations for a comparative
analysis of national approaches to deriving discharge limits and to application
of ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable). A more transparent, uniform
interpretation of the procedures applicable might prove beneficial. See Report
of the Meeting of National Experts to Consider Setting Up a Community In-
spection Force in the Field of Radiation Protection as Proposed in a Resolution
of the European Parliament, 10 September 1985, COM(86)434/3 final at 1.
375. Id. at 5.
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lows the Commission to ensure, among other things, that
the methods of performing measurement adopted at differ-
ent monitoring facilities furnish data that are sufficiently
precise and compatible. The Commission could play a very
useful role by encouraging, or even creating, the standardi-
zation of the methods of control.3 76
Amazingly, it took the Chernobyl accident for the Parliament
to get back to the issues concerning radiation protection, and
nuclear safety inspections. The fact that the Parliament res-
urrected the inspections issue indicates that the population of
the European Communities, through the Parliament, ex-
pressed that they would feel more confident if an interna-
tional inspectorate monitored national nuclear energy
activity.
If we try to measure the degree of radicalism of approach
these bodies take with respect to the level of harmonization/
internationalization of radiation protection and nuclear
safety regulation, the Parliament must be considered a radi-
cal force within the Community, followed by the Commission,
and the more conservative Member States. It should be
noted that even with their differing views, on the issue of in-
formation exchange in cases of radiological emergency, an
agreement has been reached between the Member States and
the Euratom. The Council's Decision that created interest in
this area was issued following the Convention on Early Noti-
fication of a Nuclear Accident, under the auspices of the
IAEA.3v7 Instead of reinforcing the Member States' obliga-
tions under the iAEA convention, the Decision is applied
376. "Le droit de la Commission d'acc6der A ces postes de contr6le et d'en
vWrifier le fonctionnement et l'efficacit6', implique que la Commission pourra
d6ldguer des inspecteurs sp6cialis~s en cette mati~re. Cette disposition doit
permettre A la Commission de s'assurer notamment que les m6thodes de
mesure adopt6es dans les diffirants postes fournissent des donn6es suffisament
pr6cises et comparables entre elles. La Commission pourrait jouer un r~le ex-
tr~mement utile en favorisant, sinon en cr~ant, une standardisation des
m6thodes de contr6le." See Euratom. Analyse et Commentaire du Trait 93
(1958).
377. Council Decision 87/600 on Community Arrangements for the Early Ex-
change of Information in the Event of a Radiological Emergency, 1987 O.J. (L
371) 77 (Euratom).
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"whenever a Member State decides to take measures of a
wide-spread nature in order to protect the general public in
case of a radiological emergency ... .3 7 8 At the same time,
the Commission, as it promised in its Communication on the
application of Chapter III of the Euratom Treaty on August
20 1986, started legal proceedings in the European Court of
Justice37 9 against Member States who failed to implement
the Euratom Directives.380
In the field of nuclear safety, the Euratom's achievements
have not been impressive. On June 18, 1992, the Council
adopted a Resolution on technological problems of nuclear
safety in which it encouraged coordinated action by the Mem-
ber States and the Commission in the international arena,
within the IAEA framework, toward the creation of interna-
tional safety criteria on nuclear safety.3 8 ' The Community
was acknowledging the important responsibility upon the
IAEA of regulating environmental protection from radioac-
tive pollution.
3. Concluding Analysis
There is a conflict in Euratom as far as the "regulation"
of environmental issues is concerned. This conflict centers on
the degree of harmonization of the regulatory processes. The
analysis of the Community's legislative activities shows that
the Euratom Treaty has not undergone amendments compa-
rable to the changes introduced by the Single European Act
and the Maastricht Treaty. In fact, all attempts by the Euro-
pean Parliament to introduce radically new approaches into
378. Id.
379. The Court of Justice ensures that Community institutions and Member
States observe and implement Community law. In infringement action the
Court of Justice may entertain an action alleging a Member State's failure to
fulfil its obligations under primary or secondary Community law. This action
may be brought by the Commission under article 141 of the Euratom Treaty or
by a Member State under article 142. See TEAaTIEs ESTABLISHING THE EURo-
PFAN COMMUNTES, supra note 18, at 698; Zacker, supra note 226, at 254-55.
380. See, e.g., Court of Justice, Action Brought on 2 September 1988 by the
Commission of the European Communities Against the Italian Republic 1988
O.J. (C 255) 4.
381. Council Resolution on the Technological Problems of Nuclear Safety,
1992 O.J. (C 172) 2-3 [hereinafter Problems of Nuclear Safety].
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the Euratom Treaty have been rejected by the Member
States. The Euratom Members, as a Community of States,
cannot agree on the issue of uniform emission standards -
where international regulation has been most successful,
through the IAEA on the global level. Of course, nuclear
safety continues to be the most guarded area by the Member
States against any tangible intrusion on the part of the Euro-
pean organs. One way to resolve this complex issue is to de-
termine why the Member States of the Euratom, as well as
the States in general (including those that are Members of
the IAEA), are reluctant to allow a higher degree of interna-
tional "regulation" in this area. Once the reasons behind
their reluctance has been determined, work can begin toward
a truly integrated system of radiation protection and nuclear
safety.
III. Future Responses of International Law
A. Factors Influencing the International Regulation of
Nuclear Energy
The analysis undertaken in Part II shows that interna-
tional regulation by international organizations in the area of
environmental protection faces many problems. No dramatic
progress has been achieved so far. However, progress is pos-
sible since the international regulation of nuclear energy has
a solid foundation in a body of international structures, orga-
nizations and regulations. There are several important fac-
tors that influence the process of harmonization/
internationalization in the area of environmental protection
from the adverse effects of nuclear energy. These factors are
considered in the discussion that follows.
First is the legal factor. Nuclear law in general, and the
law of protection from nuclear radiation in particular, is a
part of the general legal system of a State. Each legal system
has its own developmental history. Pelzer, a nuclear lawyer,
quotes Montesquieu, stating that; "[t]he political and civil
laws of each nation.., must be so absolutely appropriate for
the people for whom they are made, that it is a great coinci-
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dence when laws of one nations are fit for another,"38 2 and
concluding that "the wilful act of putting together parts of na-
tional legislation to an internationally harmonized legislation
might be called an even 'plus grand hazard.' 38 3 Similarly we
should refrain from harmonizing national laws on an interna-
tional level.38 4 But, Pelzer observes that many national legal
systems have developed by way of borrowing from other na-
tional legal systems.3s 5 Moreover, regulation and legislation
in the area of radiation protection has always developed with
the significant involvement of international agencies, such as
the ICRP and the IAEA.386 Pelzer continues:
The harmonizing effect of international expert knowledge
is assisted by the character of radiation protection law.
That field of law is a young one, which is not overburdened
with national legal dogmatism. It is dealing with technical
facts more than with specific legal structures and tradi-
tions, and thus remains open for new legal approaches. 38 7
Nuclear safety also deals with scientific facts. Unlike ra-
diation protection, it is influenced by national dogma. The
difference between these areas is related to the fact that radi-
ation protection is realized through the setting of doses and
levels of permissible radiation,38 8 where nuclear safety is en-
sured by the safe design of a nuclear installation, as well as
safe siting and safe operating of nuclear facilities.38 9 Nuclear
safety has a more applied character and can be more intru-
sive with respect to national nuclear programs. When the is-
382. "Les lois politiques et civiles de chaque nation.. .doivent Atre tellement
propres au peuple pour lequel elles sont faites, que c'est un grand hazard si
celles dune nation peuvent convenir A une autre." Norbert Peher, On Harmo-
nizing Nuclear Energy Law Introductory Remarks to the General Theme of Nu-
clear Inter Jura '85, in INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION IN TE FIELD OF
NuCLEAR ENERGY LAW PROCEEDINGS OF NucLEAR INTER JURA '85, 39 (Norbert
Petzer, ed. 1986) [hereinafter Harmonizing Nuclear Energy].
383. Id. at 39.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Harmonizing Nuclear Energy, supra note 382, at 40-42.
387. Id. at 42.
388. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
389. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
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sue is about nuclear safety regulation, there is more
involvement by the national nuclear establishment than in
radiation protection matters. This is because nuclear safety
standards are technical norms and requirements that have
acquired a legal form. For this reason, when new nuclear
safety standards are developed, regardless of whether they
are introduced by a domestic government or by an interna-
tionally authorized body, they can have a crucial effect on the
nuclear policy of the State in question.
The harmonization/internationalization of nuclear safety
standards can infringe substantially upon national interests
in this area-legal as well as scientific and technical. Thus,
the second factor to influence the harmonization/internation-
alization of the protection of the environment from nuclear
energy is scientific and technical. Scientific and technical iso-
lationism of a given nation can be coupled with a feeling of
superiority in the field of nuclear energy.3 90 A vivid expres-
sion of this position is found in the following consideration:
The existence of a body of international safety princi-
ples or rules might be viewed as beneficial by less techno-
logically sophisticated countries. However, the more
sophisticated countries would be unlikely to accept them
and the less sophisticated countries would be unlikely to
see any advantage in[ ] entering into international instru-
ments that would obligate the country to use of the princi-
ples or rules . . . 'Few nations would be willing to
relinquish to others the authority to set the ground rules
for these choices [national safety, economic, and energy] as
respect plants within their jurisdiction.'3 91
A fear that an international harmonization of nuclear safety
standards would inevitably mean levelling down to the lowest
common denominator is another aspect of the scientific and
technical factors. Hence, if an international standard is es-
390. Human error is always a safety concern.
391. John K. Restrick, U.S. Licensing Requirements and Recommendations
on International Principles and Rules on Licensing, in INTERNATIONAL HARMO-
NIZATION IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR ENERGY LAW PROCEEDINGS OF NucLEAR IN-
TER JURA '85, 130 (Norbert Petzer, ed. 1986).
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tablished and it turns out to be lower than that of a particu-
lar country, that country's enforceable standards would
inevitably drop down to the international level. If the stan-
dards are low, there is no incentive to further develop safer
nuclear technology. Thus, there would be no progress around
the world in moving to safe nuclear energy.
The issue of the lowest common denominator as part of a
unified regulation arises in many cases where there is a com-
plex entity involved in issuing regulations addressed to its
component parts. This is regardless of whether it is a federal
State or an international organization with strong regulatory
powers such as those of the European Communities.3 92
In the internal relationships of a complex entity with its
constituent parts, there will always be two opposing tenden-
cies: one toward unified regulation and control, and the other
toward independence of the constituent parts. Proponents of
either of these tendencies espouse equally reasonable argu-
ments to justify their respective positions. For example,
when the issue of harmonization was discussed in connection
with the application of the Euratom Standards on radiation
protection, a view expressed was that harmonization of the
Euratom standards would only be possible if every Member
State adopted the standard's principles in a "uniform or iden-
tical manner."393
The Member States' practice in implementing the Com-
munity regulations does not provide an answer as to whether
they choose to set forth more stringent standards than those
established by the Community. A question posed to the Com-
mission in the Parliament was, "can the Commission say
which Member States have since implemented Directives 80/
836/Euratom and 84/467/Euratom?" and "can the Commis-
sion say whether the Member States that have implemented
the Directive have adhered to the standards in the Directive
or are there Member States that have introduced other
392. European Union in the language of the Maastricht Treaty.
393. Abel J. Gonzdlez, Fundamental Principles of Protection and Safety for
Nuclear Power, IAEA BuLL., Vol. 34 No. 2 1992, 10.
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(stricter) standards?" 94 The Commission answered that
"certain Member States had found it difficult to adapt and
supplement their laws by the scheduled deadlines." 395 How-
ever, "the United Kingdom [UK] and Greece... ha[d] already
adopted the measures laid down in the above mentioned Di-
rectives."3 96 With regards to the strictness of the standards
adopted, neither the UK nor Greece adopted limits stricter
than those established in the Directives.3 97 "Furthermore,
the Commission was currently evaluating the progress in the
incorporation of these two Directives into the national laws of
Spain and Portugal."3 98
Harmonization of environmental protection regulation
from nuclear energy, does not have to mean the establish-
ment of standards that amount to the lowest common denom-
inator making it a fruitless effort. On the contrary, if one
looks at the same issue of harmonization/internationalization
in the area of environmental protection and safety, armed
with a different set of facts, the opposite conclusion occurs.
When the Euratom Commission issued its report on the im-
plementation of the Council resolution of June 22, 1975, it
made it clear that collaboration by the Member States led to
two beneficial effects. The fast reactor development and dem-
onstration improved, and it made the harmonization work
systematic and easier because it started at the research level,
well in advance of commercial applications. 399 This shows
that the harmonization of nuclear safety standards can be at-
tained without impeding on the development of nuclear sci-
ence, when it goes hand in hand with the internationalization
of research in this field. In addition, the internationalization
of nuclear research can in turn contribute to fast develop-
ments in the nuclear reactor industries.
394. EUR. PARL., Written Questions with Answers, No. 129/87, 1987 O.J. (C
315) 18.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. See Technological Problems, supra note 358, at 12.
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One more aspect adding to the complexity of the scien-
tific and technical factor of the harmonization of nuclear
safety standards, is the close connection between peaceful
and military technologies in the field of nuclear energy.
Knowledge in the peaceful sector can benefit the military sec-
tor and vice versa. This is relevant for both the IAEA Mem-
ber States, as well as the Euratom Member States.
The third factor is the economic one. Specifically,
whether such harmonization would impair economic coopera-
tion and competition in the area of nuclear industry. For
some writers, it seemed obvious in 1964, after only a few
years of Euratom's existence, that harmonization in the area
of radiation protection and nuclear safety would help eco-
nomic competition within Euratom. For example, Jaroslav
Polach wrote the following:
Needless to say, imposing health and safety standards af-
fects production costs. Consequently, the greater uniform-
ity exists among such standards throughout Euratom, the
greater the tendency to equalize production costs directly
imputable to these provisions. Moreover, as safety and
health protection arrangements become more nearly uni-
form in the six states [there were only six Member States
in Euratom in 1964], they cease being obstacles to labor
mobility. Thus, in both respects uniform safety rules tend
to increase competition.400
B. The Development of New Legal Instruments for the
Environmental Protection from Nuclear Energy
Having explored the factors that influence the process of
harmonization/internationalization of radiation protection
and nuclear safety, the author now turns to analyzing what
may be the future responses of international law to this
problem.
Probably the most noticeable developments in interna-
tional law in the area of environmental protection from radio-
400. Jaroslav G. Polach, Euratom. Its Background, Issues and Economic Im-
plications 94 (1964).
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active pollution have taken place under the auspices of the
IAEA. The role of the IAEA has been so important to the in-
ternational community that the Euratom seems to be ready
to give the IAEA the bulk of its work in the areas of nuclear
safety and radiation protection. 40 1
In early September of 1991, the IAEA held an Interna-
tional Conference on Nuclear Safety in Vienna. The Confer-
ence's final document declared that there was a "need to
consider an integrated approach to all aspects of nuclear
safety . . . which would be adopted by all Governments
. *..."402 Later that same month, the IAEA's General Confer-
ence passed a resolution in which it invited the Director Gen-
eral to prepare, for the Board's consideration in February
1992, a draft nuclear safety convention.403 This resulted in
an outline of a potential agenda for a nuclear safety conven-
tion, taking into account the activities and roles of relevant
international and intergovernmental bodies. 40 4
In the meantime, while the Secretariat of the Agency was
working on the draft Convention, a discussion was published
as "a proposed basis for a harmonized approach to radiation
protection and nuclear safety."40 5 Among the persons in-
volved in this discussion were Morris Rosen, Director of the
IAEA Division of Nuclear Safety, and Abel J. Gonzdlez, Dep-
401. In the series of resolutions passed by the European Parliament in the
wake of the Chernobyl accident it expressed hope that,
the European Community acting in the framework of international
bodies and in particular the IAEA, will play a more active part with
regard to... the drawing up of safety standards and rules for the
construction and operation of reactors in particular with regard to
inspection provisions [and stressed, in connection with the concern
about the safety of nuclear reactors in Eastern Europe, that] the
IAEA is the most suitable body at international level for these
tasks, as Eastern European states are also members.
Resolution on Consequences of Chernobyl Accident, supra note 354, at 98. See
also Problems of Nuclear Safety, supra note 381.
402. Morris Rosen, A Formal International Nuclear Safety Regime: The First
Steps, IAEA BuLL., Vol. 34 No. 2 1992, 6.
403. Id. at 6.
404. See id. at 6-9; Gonzdlez, supra note 393. See also INTERNATIONAL
ATozac ENERGY AGENCY, YEARBOOK 1992 D60, D66-67 (1992).
405. Gonzalez, supra note 393, at 10.
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uty Director of the IAEA Division of Nuclear Safety.40 6 There
is a slight difference in the approaches of the two authors to
the concept of the convention. Rosen writes about a nuclear
safety convention; Gonzdlez proposes a protection and safety
convention where "protection and safety" is a notion that en-
compasses radiation protection and nuclear safety.407 Since
the main principles presented by the two authors overlap,
and given the fact that Gonzdlez has a more extensive analy-
sis of the principles, the author concentrates on his article.
The regime of the convention should be based on the follow-
ing main principles:
[1] regulation by governments ... [2] justification of nu-
clear power ... [3] protection of individuals... [4] preser-
vation of the environment... [5] optimization of protection
and safety... [6] procedures of defense-in-depth.. . [7]
application of sound technical criteria... [8] attainment of
a protection and safety culture... [9] responsibility of op-
erators ... [10] reduction of de facto exposures.408
Here the protection of individuals principle, is comple-
mented by the environmental preservation principle. This
evidences a move toward recognizing the environmentalist
approach to nuclear energy. This notion encompasses several
main ideas, including an understanding that; "[a] nuclear
power must not jeopardize the general natural state of the
environment... [b] the environment is generally preserved
within its normal variations, and ... [c] the availability of
natural resources needed for a sustainable development is
not compromised."40 9
406. See Rosen, supra note 402, at 6; Gonzbdez, supra note 393, at 10.
407. Gonz.lez, supra note 393, at 10-14.
408. Id. at 11-14.
409. Gonzdlez, supra note 413, at 11. The principle also states the following
important understanding:
[Nluclear power produces radioactive byproducts and wastes that,
in the long term, might not remain isolated from the regions of the
earth's crust and the atmosphere occupied by life forms, i.e. from
the biosphere. Therefore, the expected inflow rate of radioactive
materials into the biosphere caused by the disposal of these byprod-
ucts and wastes should be a small fraction of the predicted inflow
rate to the biosphere of comparably hazardous natural radioactive
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The underlying concept for the convention is the regula-
tion by governments. This is articulated in Gonzdlez's defini-
tion of the term international regime as "an international
system aimed at the global harmonization of radiation protec-
tion and nuclear safety whereby States retain prime respon-
sibility, preeminence, and hegemony in its regulation."410
Governments should, in accordance with this theme, be pri-
marily responsible in adopting .and using nuclear power, and
in controlling nuclear installations and their radioactive
emissions.4 11 The principle also states that governments
should establish a framework of "independent regulatory or-
ganizations" to ensure the protection from and safe use of nu-
clear power.412
The positions asserted by Gonz6lez and Rosen go no fur-
ther than the general framework for an international protec-
tion and safety regime. They do not set unified or
harmonized nuclear safety or radiation protection standards.
However, the fact that they constitute a first step in the com-
plicated and controversial terrain of the internationalization
of safety and protection standards is significant in and of it-
self. This shows that:
The time seems ripe for making a proposal that may
eventually evolve into a new fundamental principle of radi-
ation protection and nuclear safety, namely: the institu-
tion of an international regime to support a globally
harmonized approach to all aspects of radiation and nu-
clear safety.413
materials (which would either naturally enter the biosphere from
the geosphere of be produced in the biosphere). Moreover, as local
environmental concentrations of radioactive materials could affect
populations of species in the biota, the inflow rate of such materials
to the environment shall be limited to ensure that neither whole
species be endangered nor imbalance be created among species.
Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
410. Id. at 13.
411. Id. at 11.
412. Id. at 11.
413. GonzAlez, supra note 393, at 14.
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It is difficult to predict what form a convention on safety
and protection will take.414 At the same time, the preceding
analysis concerning the experience of the two major "nuclear"
international organizations in establishing international ra-
diation protection and nuclear safety standards compels cer-
tain recommendations.
First, with regards to drafting an international conven-
tion on nuclear safety and radiation protection, a distinction
between these two areas should be made, and separate legal
processes should be developed accordingly. If it is justifiable
to combine nuclear safety and radiation protection when the
basic principles of an international regime of protection from
adverse effects of nuclear energy are considered, it is not fea-
sible to combine these areas when drawing specific interna-
tional standards. International "regulation" of nuclear safety
and radiation protection has reached different levels.
414. After this article had been submitted for publication, a Convention on
nuclear safety was adopted by a diplomatic conference convened by the IAEA
and opened for signature at the IAEA headquarters. Convention on Nuclear
Safety Annex, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/449 (July 1994). The adoption of the con-
vention in its present form does not persuade the author to change her position
on the future developments on the International law in this area. As a matter
of fact, a brief review of its contents reinforces the author's position. The con-
vention is applied to both nuclear safety and radiation protection. Id. at art. 3,
15, 17-19. The main principle that underlies the provisions that deal with nu-
clear safety and radiation protection is that the convention puts the primary
emphasis on the national activities of States in these areas. Thus, the conven-
tion states that it is the responsibility of States to "establish and maintain a
legislative and regulatory framework," to ensure the safety of nuclear installa-
tions. Id. at art 7,8. In siting, design and construction, as well as operation of
nuclear installations, States should ensure that "appropriate steps or proce-
dures" are taken or established. Id. at art. 17, 18, 19. In radiation protection
States undertake to ensure that national dose limits are not exceeded. Id. at art
15. Because the convention provides for a mechanism of reporting and review
meetings, it is presupposed that a certain internationalization of these national
activities of States should take place. Even given so, the convention states in
its preamble that it "... entails a commitment of findamental safety principles
for nuclear installations rather than of detailed safety standards ... ." Id. at
Preamble. Thus, confining the cooperation of States to the most general and
unspecified standards of nuclear safety and radiation protection. This brief re-
view of the conventional provisions is not meant to diminish the significance of
this instrument in promoting the exchange of information on the state of affairs
with nuclear safety and radiation protection in party States or other issues of
cooperation between States in these areas.
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In the area of radiation protection, the IAEA has estab-
lished internationalized standards, even as far as setting the
maximum levels of radioactive emissions. The problem in
this area is ensuring the implementation of these standards
by all the countries that use nuclear energy for power genera-
tion. The area of nuclear safety is far more complicated due
to various political and other vested interests concerned with
the use of nuclear energy. Nuclear safety standards in vari-
ous countries remain, to a very large extent, the domain of
the national legislation, regulation and control. Even within
the seemingly homogeneous Euratom a process of harmoniza-
tion of nuclear safety standards is now taking its first steps.
In fact, as was shown previously,415 this work is still at the
stage of determining the similarities and differences in the
regulation of nuclear safety by different countries.
Thus, work on two different conventions must begin sep-
arately. Both of them should be based on the main principles
discussed by Gonzalez and Rosen. These should be comple-
mented by the principle of international control of the compli-
ance of States with the established standards. Standard-
setting and compliance verification, should be performed by
the IAEA. All other "nuclear" international organizations
should participate in the process of standard-setting. The
IAEA and Euratom could reach an agreement on cooperation
in radiation protection and nuclear safety, and the IAEA
should learn from Euratom's experience in its attempt to har-
monize nuclear safety standards.
A convention on radiation protection can be more specific
in character. It should establish stringent mandatory stan-
dards for the protection of workers, the nearby population,
and the general public. Likewise it should establish the max-
imum permissible radioactive emissions from nuclear instal-
lations. The convention should include provisions on
international control of compliance with the standards. It
should also include a system of global monitoring of the levels
of radioactivity in the air, soil and water in various regions of
the world. These should focus on the more vulnerable re-
415. See supra notes 363-64 and accompanying text.
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gions, determined by either the density of the population or
the character of nature. An obligatory incident reporting sys-
tem should be created, comparable to the one established by
the International Civil Aviation Organization and based on
the IAEA's own experience in the operation of its Emergency
IRS established in 1989.416 The convention should provide
for international control by an international body (possibly,
by a subdivision of the IAEA) over the compliance of States
with the standards set forth in the convention.
International control over the radiation protection stan-
dards does not seem to be a technically complicated endeavor,
as opposed to the control over nuclear safety matters. The
IAEA experience in the area of safeguards over the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy serve as a model for such control. In
addition, the experience with the IAEA Radiation Protection
Advisory Service (RAPAT)417 services should be used to es-
tablish a body of inspectors.
A convention on nuclear safety would bear a more gen-
eral and abstract character than the convention on radiation
protection. Before international standards on nuclear safety
can be drawn, a process of the harmonization of national
safety standards (including safety philosophies and operating
techniques) should be completed. The experiences of both the
IAEA and the Euratom show that harmonization of nuclear
safety is difficult in respect to the reactors that have reached
the stage of commercial exploitation. The harmonization pro-
cess is more efficient if it is done with the cooperation of
States in researching reactor safety, or specifically in design-
ing and constructing reactors. In this context, it is worth re-
calling that outside the Euratom (as well as other
international organizations), certain States have developed a
practice of entering into international agreements on cooper-
416. On the IAEA Emergency IRS, see supra notes 158-59 and accompanying
text. Another international organization-International Civil Aviation Organi-
zation (ICAO)-also has an incident reporting system. Unlike the IAEA Emer-
gency Reporting System, in which participation is general but not obligatory,
the ICAO system requires obligatory incident reporting and also includes acci-
dent investigation. See Rosen, supra note 402, at 7.
417. 1 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 785 (Union of Intl As-
soc. ed., 31st ed. 1994).
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ation in matters of nuclear safety, more specifically reactor
safety. The United States has extensive practice of conclud-
ing such agreements.418
The convention on nuclear safety should include a special
section on the internationalization of nuclear science. States
must develop a different approach to the whole area of nu-
clear research and development (including reactor develop-
ment and demonstration). An open exchange of research
would spare national nuclear sectors from a blind-valley type
of development. It is true that the number one reason for the
Chernobyl accident was the secrecy in which the national nu-
clear industry was developing. This atmosphere of secrecy
surrounding nuclear science and technology in the then So-
viet Union resulted in the suppression of alternative domestic
nuclear reactor designs with enhanced safety features, such
as Fast Neutron Reactors. 41 9 Effective coordination of na-
tional research in the matters of safety of nuclear reactors
should be established.
It would be premature to speak about a system of inter-
national verification over nuclear safety matters when there
is no unified mandatory system of nuclear safety standards.
While the process of harmonizing the safety standards appli-
cable to the existing reactors is under way, a system of inter-
national missions to the existing nuclear installations should
be established. A good starting point for this is in the Euro-
418. See, e.g., Arrangement on Technical Information Exchange and Re-
search and Development on Reactor Safety, Nov. 21, 1974, U.S.-Swed., 27
U.S.T. 2710; Agreement on Reactor Safety Experiments, Nov. 10, 1976, U.S.-
U.K., 28 U.S.T. 6740; Agreement on Reactor Safety Experiments, Jan. 24, 1975,
U.S.-other gov. (Fr., Germ., Japan, Den., Fin., Nor. & Swed.), 28 U.S.T. 629;
Agreement on Reactor Safety Experiments, Apr. 14, 1977, U.S.-other gov. (Fr.,
Den., Fin., Nor., Swed. & Neth.), 30 U.S.T. 129; Agreement on Research Partici-
pation and Technical Exchange in Reactor Safety, May 2, 1978, U.S.-Fr.-Germ.,
30 U.S.T. 7595; Agreement on Technical Information Exchange and Reactor
Safety Research, Apr. 26, 1977, U.S.-Germ, 29 U.S.T. 4207; Agreement on Tech-
nical Information Exchange on Light Water Reactor Safety Research, Sept. 23,
1974, U.S.-Fr., 27 U.S.T. 3401.
419. Future of Nuclear Energy, supra note 354, at 89. After the Chernobyl
accident, the European Parliament requested the Commission to "evaluate the
feasibility of the wider use in the EC of reactor types with enhanced safety fea-
tures, [among them] the Fast Neutron Reactors working in France, the United
Kingdom and the USSR." Id.
19941 265
81
266 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12
pean Community's lead in seeking, independent of drafting
binding international agreements, or in the event of it being
impossible to reach such agreements, that all States should
allow their power plants to be examined by IAEA experts.
This should be done, if necessary, without a formal right of
appeal.
Operational Safety Review Teams (OSART's)4 20 brief
must be related more specifically to principles of reactor
safety. The teams should also be able to put forward practi-
cal and realistic suggestions for improvements. This modi-
fied role of OSART presupposes that the teams will no longer
be so large and will not be as international in composition,
but will comprise only a few, very highly qualified experts
with considerable experience. "[R]epresentatives of the oper-
ators and manufacturers of nuclear power plants can be in-
volved in safety checks but not safety assessments."421
C. Concluding Analysis
A considerable degree of harmonization/internationaliza-
tion of the regulation of the environmental aspects of nuclear
energy has been achieved, especially in the area of radiation
protection. This author would probably surprise the reader if
at this point she raised the question of how a higher degree of
international regulation would contribute to better environ-
mental protection from hazards of nuclear energy. In fact, is
it at all possible to guarantee environmental protection
through international regulation?
The inherent dangers of nuclear energy make some writ-
ers on this subject argue that nuclear energy should not and
cannot be placed in the list of other sources of energy.422 Ac-
cording to this point of view, nuclear energy should constitute
a separate category of energy sources and be viewed as such.
In this context, the reader can ask whether nuclear energy
should be treated the way nuclear weapons are treated. The
420. 1 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 785 (Union of Intl As-
soc. ed., 31st ed. 1994).
421. Mutual Assistance, supra note 354, at 95.
422. This list includes gas, oil, coal, and hydropower.
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comparison between the environmental effects of different
sources of energy, including nuclear energy, is valid only un-
til a nuclear accident occurs. The consequences of a nuclear
accident would then outweigh the negative effects of all other
energy sources combined.
Regardless of how nuclear energy is considered, one has
to be aware that nuclear energy is not a given and predeter-
mined reality. It was discovered by the human mind and it is
the human mind that has made it serve the various needs of
the people, including destructive purposes. Likewise, it is at
the discretion of people to decide that the time has come to
renounce the use of nuclear energy for any purpose. Any de-
cision of this magnitude is a political decision based on tech-
nical and scientific knowledge in this area.
International law will play its role in whatever events oc-
cur. In case nuclear energy is renounced, international law
would be recruited to provide the legal basis for dismantling
nuclear industries and eliminating their heritage. Today, in-
ternational law should provide for the establishment of the
free exchange of information in the area of nuclear energy.
This way will enhance public understanding of the problems
of nuclear energy and facilitate political decision making. It
is important to point out that the more countries, organiza-
tions and institutions (governmental and non-governmental)
that become involved in the international legal process, the
less likely the process will find itself under the influence of a
strong international nuclear establishment.
1994] 267
83
